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During the period under consideration here,' the most significant
event was Florida's adoption of a new constitution (1968) which, like
its predecessor, has few provisions affecting conflict law. The recent
legislature, convened in 1969, was mainly concerned with education,
criminal law, and administration. But there may still be hope that at
some future time the most unsatisfactory matters, among them juris-
diction and service, will be given proper attention by Florida lawmakers.
I. GENERAL PROBLEMS
The rule that the limitation of actions is a matter of the lex fori
still stands, with the understanding that some other statute of limita-
tions may apply whenever the forum's borrowing statute so orders.
In Lescard v. Keel,2 this rule was coupled with the doctrine of lex loci
delicti, so that the law applicable under the Florida borrowing statute
was that of Georgia, where the cause of action arose.
The borrowing statute was also applied in Beasley v. Fairchild
Hiller Corporation," an action brought by a pilot against the manufac-
turer for damages arising out of an accident in Louisiana. Under
Florida Statutes section 95.10, the shorter statute of limitations pre-
vails. The answer to the question of which statute of limitations was
shorter, that of Florida or of Louisiana, depended on the characterization
of the cause of action as one in contract or in tort. The court started
from the "general rule of law that the law of the forum will characterize
the cause of action for conflicts of law purposes ' 4 and found that under
Florida law the action was one ex contractu and barred in three years,
a period not yet elapsed. Following the dictates of section 95.10,
however, the court turned to the law of Louisiana to "determine
whether this count could have been maintained in the Louisiana courts
on the date it was filed in Florida."' The Louisiana Civil Code bars
actions ex contractu after ten years but distinguishes breach of war-
ranty actions into two types, one of which is based on liability to a
consumer and characterized as a tort action. This tort action carries a
one-year statute of limitations. Since plaintiff "was not the owner of
the helicopter and had not purchased it . . ."' from the defendant
manufacturer, the court concluded that he was a consumer whose cause
1. This survey should be read in conjunction with Bayitch, Conflict of Laws, 1957-
1963 Survey of Florida Law, 18 U. MIAMI L. REv. 269 (1963); Bayitch, Conflict of
Laws, 1964-1966 Survey of Florida Law, 20 U. MIAMI L. REv. 495 (1966); Bayitch,
Conflict of Laws, 1967-1968 Survey of Florida Law, 22 U. MIAMI L. Rnv. 509 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Survey I, Survey II, and Survey III respectively].
2. 211 So.2d 868 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
3. 401 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1968).
4. Id. at 596
5. Id.
6. Id.
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of action would be classified as ex delictu by the Louisiana court.7
Thus, the Louisiana period of limitations would be one year, shorter
than the Florida forum's three year period, and the Louisiana statute
would bar the action.
The problem of characterization was involved in Beasley' which
followed the generally accepted rule of the lex fori. The device known
under the name of renvoi, frequently considered un-American, 9 seems
to be looking forward to more propitious times if frequent statutory
adoptions are any indication.1"
A belatedly advanced defense of the statute of limitations proved
fatal to the defendant in an action1 brought by a passenger against
the manufacturer for damages resulting from an unsafe seatbelt on an
aircraft. After unsuccessful attempts to litigate the matter in Pennsyl-
vania and Delaware, the action was filed in 1962 in a New York federal
court.1 2 Four years later, the trial court granted the corporate defendant
leave to amend its answer, thus enabling it to present the defense of
the California statute of limitations, applicable as the law of the state
where the aircraft was sold and delivered to the air carrier (not involved
in this litigation)." Noticing the unusual delay in presenting a vital
defense, the appellate court found that if the defendant had pleaded
the California statute of limitations as a defense when it first answered,
the plaintiff would have had ample time to initiate his litigation in
Florida 4 and take advantage of her three-year limitation period. Be-
cause of the "substantial prejudice to plaintiff caused by defendant's
excessive delay in raising the statute of limitations defense, the court
below abused its discretion in permitting defendant to amend its
answer." 5 The case was remanded for retrial.
The question of how to deal with foreign law was involved in two
interstate and one international conflict cases. In Cordrey v. Cordrey,'6
the court held that "in the absence of specific pleading and proof of
any foreign law applicable . . . the law of Florida should obtain and
control."' In Movielab, Inc. v. Davis,18 the court applied Florida law
because the plaintiff did not cbmply with the requirements of Florida
Statutes section 92.031, which requires specific pleading and proof of
7. Id.; cf. Gaston v. B.F. Walker, Inc., 400 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1968).
8. Beasley v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 401 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1968).
9. Hobbs v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 195 F. Supp. 56, 63 (N.D. Ind. 1961).
10. See ch. V. infra (Uniform Commercial Code); 49 U.S.C. § 313(d) (1965).
11. Strauss v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 404 F.2d 1152 (2d Cir. 1968).
12. Id. at 1158.
13. See page 1155 of the appellate court's opinion for an explanation of the events
which occurred at the trial of the Strauss case. Cf. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 411 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1969) and 424 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1970).
14. Strauss v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 404 F.2d 1152, 1157 (2d Cir. 1968).
15. Id.
16. 206 So.2d 234 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
17. Id. at 239.
18. 217 So.2d 890 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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foreign law. The court held that a mere memorandum of foreign law in
opposition to defendant's request to amend his answer, did not meet the
"test of a pleading, which appears to be the requirement imposed by
the... authorities in the State of Florida for one who attempts to seek
benefits of Fla. Stat. § 92.031."'1 The international case involved the
law of Honduras. In Banco de Honduras, S.A. v. Prenner,° the court
held that Honduran law controls. The court added that the "recital of
the facts with reference to Honduran law would be lengthy and
without conceivable value as a Florida precedent," contenting itself
with saying that they approved the comprehensive and careful order.21
The effect of the Act of State doctrine was crucial in Tabacalera
Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Company.22 A Cuban corporation
and its sole stockholder, an assignee of the claim, brought an action against
a Florida corporation to obtain payment for tobacco from Cuba delivered
to the corporate defendant before Castro's takeover. The defense urged
the Act of State doctrine which would, if successful, take the claim out
of plaintiff's hands in view of the fact that the plaintiff corporation was
"intervened," i.e., sequestrated, in Cuba and put in the hands of an
official intervenor. The general principle of the doctrine is well known:
No country may by its own acts disregard governmental dispositions of
a foreign government, provided such dispositions are done within its (the
foreign country's) territory." In deciding whether or not to apply the
Sabbatino rule,24 the court found two distinctions: first, that in Sabbatino
the act of the Cuban government was direct and open confiscation, while
in the present case the action of the Cuban government took on the form
of an intervention which does not amount to outright confiscation; second,
in Sabbatino, the act of the Cuban government took effect within Cuban
territory in regard to a res located there, while in the present case, the
potential Cuban governmental disposition would be directed toward in-
tangible property, namely a credit relationship between the parties. Thus,
being outside of the proper scope of the Sabbatino rule, the issue took on
a double aspect: First, whether the intervenor's authority or actions
prevented the enforcement of the claim in a federal court, which was
answered in the negative after a careful check of the intervenor's au-
19. Id. at 892.
20. 211 So.2d 600 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
21. Id. See also Western Life Ins. Co. v. Nanney, 296 F. Supp. 432 (E.D. Tenn.
1969) (Florida law applied in Tennessee); First Nat'l City Bank v. Compania de
Aguaceros, S.A., 398 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1968) (regarding FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1); Simmons
v. Continental Cas. Co., 410 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1969) (impact of the Erie Doctrine).
22. 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1968), noted in 23 U. MAMI L. REv. 243 (1968). On
general conflict problems involved see Mann, International Corporations and National
Law, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145 (1967), and Seidl-Hohenveldern, The Impact of Public
International Law on Conflict of Laws Rules on Corporations, 123 RECUEIL DES CoUnRS
7 (1968).
23. Bayitch, Florida and International Legal Developments: 1962-1963, 18 U. MIAMi
L. REV. 321, 345 (1963).
24. Banco Nacional v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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thority. The other question was broader in scope; namely, whether the
doctrine applies when it may be shown that the plaintiff would have no
chance in Cuba to recover. Even if the court only impliedly answered this
question, it is clear that the mere possibility of a certain type of action
or of the probability of a certain decision does not present an act of a
foreign government and is utterly immaterial. Finally, the court held
that the Cuban government did not have the necessary "physical control
over [the] species of property represented by this claim ... and, conse-
quently, there could be no violation of the doctrine even if the Cuban
government would have taken all steps" which "its unlimited power
would have permitted it to take ... ,2 in order to reach and control the
claim.
Among recent treaties, the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, signed at New York in 1967 and ratified (with reservations) by the
United States, 26 deserves mentioning. The Protocol has brought into ef-
fect, with some modifications, the United Nations sponsored Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed at Geneva in 1951. Here only
a few fundamental questions will be discussed. One affects the definition
of refugees within the scope of the Protocol. In this respect the limitation
contained in the Convention mainly including refugees whose status
resulted from events prior to January 1, 1951, has been eliminated while
the substantive definition has been retained. A refugee is a person who
[o]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nation-
ality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside of the country of his former
habitual residence . . . is unable or, owing to such fear, is un-
willing to return to it.27
The Protocol applies to all such persons regardless of whether the
"country of [their] nationality" has ratified the Protocol; provided they
have not lost their refugee status2 or been disqualified. 29
The Protocol also contains what is termed the federal clause, 80
providing that for federal (nonunitary) states the "obligations of the
Federal Government shall . . . be the same as those of States Parties
25. Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 714 (Sth
Cir. 1968); cf. French v. Banco Nacional, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433
(1968).
26. [19681 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577. Weis, The 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees and Some Questions of the Law of Treaties, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 39 (1967).
27. Id. art. I(A)(2).
28. Id. art. 1(C)(1)-(2).
29. Id. art. I(F).
30. Id. art. VI.
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which are not Federal States" in regard to those articles of the Conven-
tion (incorporated into the Protocol) which "come within the legislative
jurisdiction of the federal legislative authority."31 Since in this country
such authority exists in view of the necessary and proper clause, 2 the
Protocol is directly enforceable and no action by the constituent states
is necessary.3
Generally, the Convention grants refugees the general alien treat-
ment, except where the Convention contains more favorable provisions. 4
In case such treatment is, by treaty or otherwise, subject to reciprocity,
such requirement expires after three years residence by the refugee in
the host country. 5 Other provisions of greater interest will be mentioned
at the proper places in this Survey.
II. JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS
Two factors determine the exercise of the court's power to take
cognizance of cases-whether the parties or the thing involved are
amenable to the court and whether the court is competent to adjudicate
the particular type of litigation. Either factor may shift the judicial
jurisdictional problem to the international level whenever the parties or
the object of litigation transcend international boundaries.3" The juris-
dictional problem may be interstate in nature or a simple intrastate
proposition.
From this point of view, venue appears to be an intrastate matter,
distinct from jurisdiction. The difference was restated in Steward v.
Carr. 7 The court defined venue as the "privilege to be accountable to a
Court of a particular location," which refers to a "geographic area in
which the defendant to a suit has generally the right to be sued" while
jurisdiction is "the power to act, the authority to adjudicate the subject
matter.13
8
Jurisdiction is based on contacts between the parties, the thing
involved, or the cause of action, and the particular jurisdictional unit of
a state or of a country. Whenever jurisdiction is properly perfected, not
only the defendant becomes amenable to adjudication, but also the plain-
tiff, who, by bringing the action, submits himself to any decisions which
result from the proceedings he initiated. The capacity in which he in-
stituted the action, however, may vary this rule. For example, in Fidelity-
31. Id.
32. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
33. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. VI(a), [1967] 19 U.S.T. 6223,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577.
34. Id. art. 7, para. 1.
35. Id. art. 7, para. 2.
36. Deddish, Judicial Jurisdiction: A Study in International and Comparative Law,
6 COMP. JURID. REv. 55 (1969).
37. 218 So.2d 525 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). See also United States ex rel. Rudick v. Laird,
412 F.2d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1969) (for a restatement of differences).
38. 218 So.2d 525, 527 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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Philadelphia Trust Company v. Ball, 9 where an action was brought
by nonresident trustees, the court ruled that the fact that they have
"submitted themselves ... to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts does
not amount to a submission of themselves to the jurisdiction of the court
for purposes of adjudicating claims against them personally.'"40
Consent by parties to abide by the jurisdiction of a chosen court is
still frowned upon by courts. This is apparently because by so doing
parties have ousted a court from the jurisdiction it potentially had, and
transferred the case to a court which-but for the parties' agreement-
would have no jurisdiction. Florida still maintains this traditional attitude
as shown in Sausman Diversified Investments, Inc. v. Cobbs Co.:41
Generally in Florida parties to a contract cannot confer juris-
diction on a particular court by contract and conversely they
cannot oust the courts of jurisdiction vested in them by law or
irrevocably debar themselves from appealing to the established
tribunals of justice.42
The court concluded:
Since Dade County, Florida, in and of itself, has no specific
jurisdictional power, we find that this provision in the franchise
agreement does not confer exclusive jurisdiction of this cause
on the appropriate courts in and for Dade County, Florida. '
A device to establish jurisdiction, which is very suspect, is the
cognovit note. Under Florida law, the cognovit note is void regardless of
whether it was agreed upon within or without the state.44 The same policy
found expression in two additional statutes, namely Florida Statutes
section 516.16 4 and the recently enacted section 520.74.46 The Uniform
Commercial Code leaves the Florida rule invalidating the confession of
judgment intact.4"
The effect of the clause for confession of judgment on the basic
underlying transaction between the litigants, i.e., on two promissory
notes containing the clause, was at issue in Vineberg v. Brunswick Cor-
poration.4  The defendant relied on Pearson v. Friedman49  which,
39. 208 So.2d 282 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
40. Id. at 285. Huntley v. Alejandre, 139 So.2d 911 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962) (an inter-
national conflict case).
41. 208 So.2d 873 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
42. Id. at 875.
43. Id.
44. FLA. STAT. § 55.05 (1967); see Survey I, at 276.
45. This regards the small loan business.
46. "No home improvement contract may contain . . . (8) Any power of attorney
to confess judgment or any power of attorney." FLA. STAT. § 520.74 (1969).
47. The Code refers to the clause as not affecting the negotiability of commercial
documents in which it appears with the proviso that this provision shall not "validate any
term which is otherwise illegal," FLA. STAT. 673.3-112(2) (1967).
48. 391 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1968).
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erroneously interpreting the full faith and credit clause, held that the
Illinois judgment recovered on the strength of the cognovit clause is
unenforceable in Florida. The Pearson court added that the scope of the
statutory rule is "more than a prohibition of the use of a procedural de-
vice; it concerns the validity of the contracts themselves."50 Distinguish-
ing the Pearson case on the fact that in the present case judgment was not
obtained nor sued upon, the federal court held that the cognovit note is
void under the Florida statute but "severable so long as judgment has
not been sought or obtained by virtue of it.""' This position seems
eminently sound. Not only does a careful reading of the Florida statute
show that it affects only the "powers of attorney for confessing or suffer-
ing judgment by default or othewise,15 2 and not the basic transaction, but
also, there is no reason why such a clause dealing with matters outside of
the basic transaction should be a kiss of death. It would be senseless to
hold that the basic transaction is unenforceable in an action in the de-
fendant's domicile in Florida just because a cognovit note in favor of
potential Illinois courts happens to be attached.
In transactions with the cognovit note attached, two different sets
of conflict problems arise.58 One problem is that of the law governing
the basic transaction; the other is that of the law governing the cognovit
clause, including its jurisdictional effect. Limiting the discussion here to
the jurisdictional aspect, it should be noted that the jurisdiction is
achieved through a blank grant of agency to the effect that such agent,
usually appointed by the plaintiff creditor, not only selects the forum
(in some jurisdictions), but also has the power to plead a confession of
judgment independently and without notice to his principal. These
devices seem patently incompatible with the standards of due process as
understood today. Not only is the defendant (principal) in fact prevented
from interposing any defenses which may have accrued to him during or
since his signing of the form, but he will also have to face the judgment so
confessed by his agent, now transformed into something almost insuper-
able under the full faith and credit clause. Such procedure is violative of
standards of fair play and substantial justice articulated by International
Shoe Co. v. Washington54 and other cases dealing with closely related
situations. Among them, only two should be mentioned. A statutory pro-
vision for appointment of an agent for service was held unconstitutional
49. 112 So.2d 894 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
50. Id. at 895.
51. Vineberg v. Brunswick Corp., 391 F.2d 184, 187 (5th Cir. 1968).
52. FLA. STAT. § 55.05 (1969).
53. Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and Full Faith
and Credit, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 111 (1961); Hunter, The Warrant of Attorney to Confess
Judgment, 8 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1941); Shuchman, Confession of Judgment as a Conflict,
36 NoTRE DAm LAW. 461 (1961); Note, Confession of Judgments, 102 U. PA. L. Rv.
524 (1954).
54. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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in Wuchter v. Pizzutti 5 because it did not provide for notice to the
defendant from the statutory agent. In National Equipment Rental, Ltd.,
v. Szukhent,56 service was saved only because the defendant had received
factual notice from the agent for service "appointed" by him in an adhe-
sion contract, a relationship considered patently lacking "intrinsic and
continuing reality.""7 Such appointment was, as expressed by the dissent,
"buried in a multitude of words [and] too weak an imitation of a genuine
agreement to be treated as a waiver of so important a constitutional
safeguard as is the right to be sued at home.
''
1
s
There is, of course, the additional question of choice of laws. In other
words, what law applies to the cognovit clause: is it the law applicable to
the basic transaction as the lex cause; or is the controlling law to be
determined independently as the law chosen by the parties (lex volun-
tatis), the law of the place of making, or the lex fori in cases where
parties have identified the court of jurisdiction. While in Vineberg the
place of making does not appear in the opinion, there is a choice of law by
parties' agreement which provides that the promissory notes are to be
"construed and interpreted according to the laws of the State of Illi-
nois."'5 9 The first task for the court would be to determine whether this
lex voluntatis was intended to apply only to the basic transaction to the
cognovit clause as well. Accepting the latter alternative, the law of Illinois
would also determine the requirements for the validity and effects of the
clause. Since it appears that the law of Illinois would hold the clause
valid and enforceable, the federal court in Florida, following Erie-
Klaxon,60 should have ascertained Florida's law regarding the lex volun-
tatis in general and with regard to cognovit notes in particular. This
was not done. Instead, the court simply applied Florida law invalidating
cognovit clauses and turned to the Florida substantive law of contracts.
The choice-of-laws issue was noticed but neatly sidestepped on the
ground that in the court below "a decision was never reached with respect
to this question."'" The court added that it is "apparent from the briefs
and from our independent research that there is neither any Florida nor
Illinois authority directly in point, and we need not reach the conflict of
laws in question. ' 62 This argument is not persuasive, however, since it
is well-settled that a correctly or an erroneously assumed gap in the law
does not dispense with the solution of a legal question which may be
crucial to the outcome. Of course, by opening this aspect of the case, the
55. 276 U.S. 13 (1928) (New Jersey nonresident motorist statute); cf. Combs v.
Chambers, 302 F. Supp. 194 (N.D. Okla. 1969).
56. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
57. Id. at 314.
58. Id. at 332.
59. Vineberg v. Brunswick Corp., 391 F.2d 184, 186 (5th Cir. 1968).
60. See ch. IV infra.
61. Vineberg v. Brunswick Corp., 391 F.2d 184, 186 (5th Cir. 1968).
62. Id.; cf. United Mercantile Agencies v. Bissonnette, 155 Fla. 22, 19 So.2d 466
(1944); Carroll v. Gore, 106 Fla. 582, 143 So. 633 (1932).
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complex issues of the Clay"5 litigations would emerge, leading into a
constitutional quicksand in which the Supreme Court left no clear foot-
prints to lead the weary seeker of the law.
It is unfortunate that the court in Pearson 4 failed to notice the op-
portunities open in full faith and credit situations. It could have found
that jurisdictional requirements in Illinois have not been met, or that
Illinois law allows the "opening up"65 of cognovit judgments on equitable
or other grounds. Instead, the court used the assumed substantive in-
validity of the basic transaction to avoid its duty under the full faith and
credit clause, a patently erroneous solution.66
A. Long-Arm Statutes
Long-arm statutes6 7 have expanded the traditional jurisdiction based
on presence, individual or corporate, by accepting other jurisdiction-
creating acts on the part of nonresident defendants. In addition to ques-
tions of statutory interpretation, and intertemporal issues as to what time
is decisive regarding the application of changing jurisdictional statutes or
changes in the jurisdiction-creating acts, long-arm statutes also raise
constitutional questions because of their expansive aims. 8 As was ex-
63. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Survey I, at 273.
64. Pearson v. Friedman, 112 So.2d 894 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959); see notes 48-49 supra
and accompanying text. Cf. Henry Bierce Co. v. Hunt, 170 So.2d 99 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964),
Survey II, at 502; also Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382, 250
N.E.2d 474 (1969).
65. Thrifti-Pak Home Appliance, Inc. v. Kowalezyk, 22 I1. App. 2d 536, 161 N.E.2d
344 (1959); L. & N. Sales Co. v. Stuski, 188 Pa. Super. 117, 146 A.2d 154 (1958);
Barrow v. Phillips, 250 I1. App. 587 (1928), relying on Forsyth v. Barnes, 228 Ill. 326,
81 N.E. 1028 (1907). Accord, McDade v. Moynihan, 330 Mass. 437, 115 N.E.2d 372
(1953). An Ohio cognovit judgment was recently "opened" in Canada, Hughes v. Sharp,
68 W.W.R. 706 (1969), reversing 66 W.W.R. 103, 70 D.L.R. 2d 298 (1968).
66. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); McDade v. Moynihan, 330 Mass. 437,
115 N.E.2d 372 (1953).
67. Long-arm statutes are expressions of a legislative attempt to create a new
basis of jurisdiction which within constitutional limitations, will afford the
citizens of a State a forum for causes of action arising from the activities of
nonresidents within the State . .. These statutes codify a new type of personal
jurisdiction based on activities deemed more relevant than mere physical presence
of a defendant or his agent in a State. As long as constitutional limits are not
crossed, a court should interpret the statute to effectuate a State's legitimate
desire to protect its citizens, . ..
deLeo v. Childs, 304 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1969). See Seidelson, Jurisdicion over
Nonresident Defendants: Beyond "Minimum Contacts" and the Long-arm Statutes, 6
DUQUESNE U.L. Rav. 221 (1967-68).
68. See Survey III, at 514. As stated in Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Serv., Inc.,
304 F. Supp. 165, (D. Minn. 1969), there are two separate issues in deciding in personam
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation:
First, does the local statute as construed by the courts of the pertinent state
subject the foreign corporation to in personam jurisdiction under the circumstances
of the case? Second, if the forum has attempted to exercise in personam jurisdiction,
does such action comport with the due process requirements of the 14th Amendment
of the United States Constitution?
In Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969), the court reversed
the sequence and turned first to the constitutional aspect of the long-arm statute and then
to the statute itself. Exploring the reach of "forum tentacles," grabbing a foreign corporation
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pressed well in a recent case, 9 there are two questions: The first is
"whether as a matter of state law, the Court would gain jurisdiction over
the defendants." 70 The other is "whether the statute in all cases requires
sufficient minimum contacts to afford due process,"" since this is not
necessarily determined by compliance with state law.
1. NONRESIDENT MOTORISTS
An unusual case involving jurisdiction over the nonresident motorist
who is responsible for damages arising out of a local car accident was
Marion County Hospital District v. Namer.72 The local Florida hospital
brought an action for services rendered to a nonresident motorist,
the victim of a car accident in Florida. Substituted service was had on
the Secretary of State under Florida Statutes section 48.171, and on the
motion to quash service, the question arose as to whether the action fell
within the scope of the statute which provides that:
[A] nonresident who operates a motor vehicle in Florida desig-
nates the secretary of the state as his agent for service of
process in any civil suit ... instituted in the courts of the state
against such operator or owner ...entitled to control of such
motor vehicle, arising out of or by reason of any accident or
collision occurring within the state in which such motor vehicle
is involved. (Emphasis added.)
It is significant that this action did not involve the participants in the
accident or collision, nor did it involve any claim between these parties.
Instead, the action was brought by the hospital, an outsider who has only
a remote connection with the consequences of the accident. The hospital
did not have a claim "arising out of or by reason of any accident or col-
lision" but one arising out of a contract entered into by the victim of the
accident. The court, however, saw the issue as only involving the question
of whether contract claims as well as tort claims are within the scope of
the statute. The court answered the question so formulated in the affirma-
five, finding its answer to be "in accord with the general weight of au-
thority prevailing in this country. 7 3 The court also interpreted the word
on the basis of one act (injury from defective amusement device operated in the juris-
diction), the court was satisfied, particularly in view of the fact that the foreign
corporation "introduced this [device] into interstate commerce with reason to know that
the [device] would probably eventually nomadize through the state," adding that "where
a nonresident corporation engages in a single isolated transaction in a state and a tort
claim arises out of the activity, the state may assert jurisdiction over the nonresident
corporation without contravening due process." Id. at 597.
69. Williams v. Vick Chem. Co., 279 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Iowa 1967).
70. Id. at 836.
71. Id. at 836; cf. Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Serv., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 167
(D. Minn. 1969).
72. 225 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
73. Id. at 447. See also Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-90, § 48.182, dealing with jurisdiction
over nonresidents who commit wrongful acts outside of Florida which cause injury within
the state.
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"any" literally as meaning "every" or "unlimited" and concluded that
the expression "any civil action" ordinarily includes "actions ex con-
tractu, as well as actions ex delicto, unless other language in the statute
clearly indicates a contrary intent." 4 Of course, there can be no quarrel-
ing with the policy followed by the court that:
[t]his construction will rebound to the advantage of non-
residents injured in highway accidents in Florida and obtaining
emergency treatment of their injuries in the hospitals, which
can afford to extend them credit, knowing that, if the non-
resident motorist drives on out of the state, and then defaults,
the hospital will not be forced to seek him in his home state and
file the action in that state.7 5
In Green v. Nashner76 the appellate court found error in the denial
of defendant's motion to quash service because although the plaintiff
mailed the notice of service on the secretary of state and a copy of the
complaint and summons to the defendant at an address in Michigan the
plaintiff "failed to show any connection between the defendant and the
address.. .. "7 It appears that the letter was returned unclaimed. In this
respect the court, relying on Zazcone v. Lesser,'78 held that such a fact
presents a justiciable question whether the failure to claim the letter
expresses the defendant's rejection or may have resulted from a cause not
chargeable to him.
2. NONRESIDENT AIRCRAFT AND WATERCRAFT OPERATORS
As reported in the previous Survey,' 9 the 1967 Florida Legislature
reenacted the prior Florida Statutes section 47.162 as Florida Statutes
section 48.19, without noticing that the 1963 legislature had amended this
provision so as to exclude nonresident operators of aircraft."0 The 1969
legislature apparently forgot to correct this faux pas.
3. BUSINESS BY NONRESIDENTS
Long-arm statutes subject nonresident businesses, individual and
corporate, to those jurisdictions where their profitable activities take or
have taken place under the premise that by taking advantage of the local
business opportunities they make themselves amenable to local courts. As
expressed in a recent case,' a "nonresident [who] wishes to afford itself
74. Marion County Hosp. Dist. v. Namer, 225 So.2d 442, 447 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
75. Id.; cf. Penn. v. Ashley, 226 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
76. 216 So.2d 492 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
77. Id. at 493.
78. 190 So.2d 805 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966). See Survey III, at 516; cf. Massengill v.
Campbell, 391 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1968).
79. See Survey III, at 517.
80. See Survey II, at 504. The omission was corrected by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-90.
81. Hubsch Mfg. Co. v. Freeway Washer & Stamping Co., 205 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1967).
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of the privilege of the Florida markets," creates thereby "attendent
obligations which justice requires [to] be determined in the local
forum."82 The Florida statute is directed at those who, "having his or
their principal place of business in this state engage in business." 3 An-
other section of the statutes describes the nonresidents amenable to
process as those who "operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business
or business venture in the state or have an office or agency in the state."84
Furthermore, such activities will suffice provided that there is connexite
in the sense that the action arises "out of any transaction or operation
connected with or incidental to the business or business venture." 5
There is one exception to the connexite rule however.8 It is dispensed
with if the non-resident corporation has "a business office within the
state" and is "actually engaged in the transaction of business there-
from. ,8
7
Before undertaking a survey of cases applying these statutory pro-
visions, some general problems should be discussed. One is the question
of their intertemporal application, particularly whether they apply retro-
actively to jurisdiction-creating acts which occurred prior to the statute's
coming into force. Florida's courts have consistently held that these
statutes must not be given retroactive effect.88 However, in Donnelly v.
Kellogg Company,s9 the federal court sitting in diversity overlooked the
decisive intertemporal problem. Even though the aviation accident out of
which the claim arose occurred in November 1966, the court nevertheless
considered the question of whether the case fell within the scope of the
Simari amendment, not enacted until 1967.90 A related problem was at
issue in Masters, Inc. v. Corley,91 where service on the secretary of state,
according to section 48.181 of the Florida Statutes was attacked on the
ground that the jurisdiction-creating activity on the part of the New
York corporation operating a department store in Miami existed at the
time the claim arose but had ceased at the time of the substituted
service. Using the criterion of "minimum business contacts," the court
held the service to be effective since the corporate defendant was "doing
business in the state during the time when the cause of action arose," 92
82. Id. at 339.
83. FLA. STAT. § 48.071 (1967). For a definition of business, see Southern Machine Co.
v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968).
84. FLA. STAT. § 48.181(1) (1967).
85. FLA. STAT. § 48.081(1) (1967).
86. This was the Simari Amendment enacted in 1967; see Survey III, at 525.
87. FLA. STAT. § 48.181(5) (1967).
88. See Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 128 So.2d 594 (Fla. 1961), Survey I, at 282.
There is no constitutional prohibition against retroactivity, McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
89. 293 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
90. FLA. STAT. § 48.081(5) (1967).
91. 222 So.2d 465 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969); cf. Herpst v. S.B.I. Liquidating Corp., 279
F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
92. Id. at 466.
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even though it did not "maintain minimal business contacts within the
state"'93 at the time of service, on the ground that the long-arm statute
was "in full force and effect at the time of the injury" 94 which the plain-
tiff suffered in defendant's store. The dissenting judge,95 relying on a
substantially identical set of precedents, reached the opposite conclusion.
It appears, however, that the solution reached by the majority represents
the better rule. First of all, the statute expressly subjects defendants who
"subsequently became nonresidents of the state" to local jurisdiction.
Furthermore, in all cases of one-act transactions, jurisdiction would be
simply unavailable. Finally, the basis of this type of long-arm statute is
the "acceptance ...of the privilege extended by law to nonresidents"96
to engage in local business, the jurisdictional "incident" of which, once
accrued, does not evaporate because the privileged party has left the
state. 7
It is well established that the jurisdiction-creating acts must not only
be properly alleged but also supported by affidavits attached to the com-
plaint in order to "substantiate the jurisdictional allegation." 8 The
motion to quash service must be similarly supported."9
Turning now to jurisdiction-creating acts, the following cases may
illustrate judicial attitudes. A corporation sending its officers, engineers,
and salesmen into Florida and making sales within the state provided
sufficient contacts in an action for damages resulting from delivery of
defective hardware.1'1 In Woodham v. Northwestern Steel & Wire Co.,' 10
the facts that both foreign corporate defendants leased office space in the
state, owned office furniture and paid state taxes on it, maintained res-
ident business agents who worked in Florida for about fifteen years
and additional clerical personnel actively soliciting business, and had
telephone listings in the state in their own name, out of which activities
a large volume of business was generated, persuaded the court that the
constitutional standard of minimum contacts was met.
In a number of cases the courts failed to find the necessary jurisdic-
tional contacts. In Sausman Diversified Investments, Inc. v. Cobbs
Company,'10 2 the mere fact that the plaintiff executed a franchise agree-
ment with the defendant in Florida while the latter signed it in Pennsyl-
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 467.
96. FLA. STAT. § 48.181(1) (1967).
97. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
98. Industrial Lub., Inc. v. Ceco Steel Prod. Corp., 214 So.2d 507 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968);
Hydronaut, Inc. v. Litton Systems, Inc., 208 So.2d 494 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
99. Viking Superior Corp. v. W.T. Grant Co., 212 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
100. Hubsch Mfg. Co. v. Freeway Washer & Stamping Co., 205 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1967).
101. 390 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1968). That same constitutional approach was applied in
Dickinson v. Gracy, 210 So.2d 270 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968) and Hoffman v. Air India, 393 F.2d
507 (5th Cir. 1968).
102. 208 So.2d 873 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
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vania and permitted plaintiff to supervise his activities in Florida, did not
amount to doing business. In another case, an Israeli corporation owning
a motor vessel, the Jamaica Queen, and maintaining an office in England
while its president, a Canadian, resided in Texas, was held not to have the
necessary "minimum contacts" with Florida.'0 3 Following Williams v.
Duval County Hospital Authority,' it was held in Fine v. Snyder" 5 and
in Rumsch v. DeVaney'0 6 that practicing the medical profession in
Florida did not amount to engaging in business under Florida Statutes
section 47.16(1), nor does the mere solicitation of business.0 7
While courts interpret engaging in business to mean a more or less
continuous activity, the notion of business venture is preferably used in
one-act situations. A promissory note executed by Tennessee residents
and delivered in Florida was held not to amount to a business venture
regardless of the fact that one of the nonresident purchasers of stock in a
Florida corporation came to Florida for the closing of the deal.' Neither
did the additional fact that the defendant purchasers made the invest-
ment for profit nor the fact that the defendants now owned stock in the
Florida corporation and that one of them attended a stockholders meet-
ing in Florida persuade the court. A recent case considering the meaning
of the term business venture deviated from the usual one-act type of
interpretation. In McCarthy v. Little River Bank and Trust Company'09
the defendant, a resident of Minnesota, was unsuccessful with his motion
to quash service urging that his activities in connection with his uncle's
estate in Florida were not business in the statutory sense. In this respect,
the appellate court abandoned the one-act connotation and held that the
term business venture does not apply "exclusively to commercial trans-
actions for benefit,"" 0 citing no authority for the proposition. The court
also found that the defendant's acts in Florida were "done for the purpose
of realizing a pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an objec-
tive.""' In pursuance of this aim, defendant
[p]ersonally hired an attorney, signed notes, endorsed checks,
paid the balance of his uncle's account at the hospital, took
103. Goffer v. Weston, 217 So.2d 896 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
104. 199 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
105. 207 So.2d 695 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
106. 218 So.2d 238 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
107. Service Station Aid, Inc. v. National Hose Co., 210 So.2d 257 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968),
quashed and remanded, 228 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1969); cf. Marotta v. Pittsburg, 27 Fla. Supp.
125 (Broward County Cir. Ct. 1966). Regarding amenability of Florida corporations to
long-arm statutes of foreign jurisdictions, see Marival, Inc. v. Planes, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 201
(N.D. Ga. 1969); Platt Corp. v. Platt, 17 N.Y.2d 234, 217 N.E.2d 134, 270 N.Y.S.2d 408
(1966); Rose v. Sans Souci Hotel, Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 1099, 274 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1966); DiLido
Hotel v. Nettis, 257 A.2d 643 (Pa. 1969).
108. Uible v. Landstreet, 392 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968).
109. 224 So.2d 338 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). Business venture as meaning a "lesser involve-
ment"; see Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp. v. All Coverage Underwriters, Inc., 200 So.2d 564
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
110. Id. at 341.
111. Id.
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possession of the personal papers and property of his uncle, and
examined the uncle's business property and real estate, de-
manded access and obtained the contents of his uncle's safety
deposit box by signing his uncle's name, and took possession of
his uncle's car, watch and ring.112
The court concluded that defendant was "engaged in a series of similar
acts done for the purpose of realizing a pecuniary benefit within the
State of Florida or otherwise accomplishing an object and that service of
process upon him under Fla. Stat. § 48.181, F.S.A., was proper.""' There
are no reported cases dealing with jurisdictional fact of having "an office
or agency in the state" under section 48.181 (1), Florida Statutes.
The long-arm statute was expanded in 1957114 to include engaging in
business by proxy. This alternative is frequently used in an attempt to
show that nonresident corporate defendants engage in business in Florida
through their closely related or even wholly owned subsidiaries. Even
though the Florida subsidiary in Hermetic Seal Corporation v. Savoy
Electronics, Inc."' had interlocking officers and directors with the parent
corporation which made several loans to the subsidiary, guaranteed some
of its loans and filed a consolidated tax return, the court nevertheless
maintained that the "mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship"
and even the fact of "owning the stock of a corporation""' 6 does not
amount to doing business in the state on the part of the parent corpora-
tion. The holding was further supported by the facts that the subsidiary
used its physical plant in Florida for which it paid rent to an independent
lessor, maintained its own bank accounts, employed its own personnel,
and was administered by its own board of directors who met and acted
independently from the parent corporation's board. Admitting the pos-
sibility that the Florida subsidiary might be acting as a jobber or dis-
tributor through which the parent corporation sells its products in
Florida, the court found no proof to support this conclusion. Finally,
the attempt by the plaintiff to show that the subsidiary was but an alter
ego or an instrumentality of the parent corporation also failed. Instead,
the court found that the subsidiary "sets its own policies and operates its
own business-a business which is foreign to the [parent's] oil busi-
ness."" 7 The plaintiff in Industrial Lubricants, Inc. v. Ceco Steel Products
Corporation,"s had even less of a chance to prove that the subsidiary was
an alter ago of the parent. In that case, the relationship between the two
112. Id.
113. Id. For constitutional problems involved in one-act situations see Everly Aircraft
Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969); Adams Dairy Co. v. National Dairy Prod.
Corp., 293 F. Supp. 1135 (W.D. Mo. 1968); and note 68 supra.
114. See Survey I, at 283.
115. 290 F. Supp. 240 (S.D. Fla 1967).
116. Id. at 243.
117. Id.
118. 214 So.2d 507 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
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corporations was only one of the buy-and-sell type, and the court held
that such a relationship did not suffice to make a local corporation an
agent of the dependent foreign corporation.
The interpretation of Florida Statutes section 48.181 (3) was squarely
before the court in Donnelly v. Kellogg Company."' The plaintiff claimed
damages for his wife's death in the crash of a plane owned by the de-
fendant company, a foreign corporation. In view of the fact that the
foreign defendant sold and distributed its products through the wholly
owned Kellogg Sales Company, a Florida corporation, the court held that
"it would be presumed that Kellogg Company was doing business in
Florida"'20 under section 48.181(3). As it will be shown later, however,
the requirement of connexite was lacking and the action was dismissed
for this reason.
In addition to the jurisdiction-creating acts on the part of the de-
fendant, Florida long-arm statutes in general, and those dealing with
nonresident business in particular, require connexite in the sense that the
cause of action must arise from or in connection with such acts. In Saus-
man Diversified Investments,'2' the court not only found a lack of juris-
dictional facts but also, illogically and unnecessarily, a lack of connexite.
In contrast, in Hermetic Seal Corporation2 2 the court properly did not
reach the question of connexity once it found that there were no jurisdic-
tion-creating acts on the part of the corporate defendant. In Curtiss-
Wright Corporation v. King,"3 the court sustained jurisdiction on the
ground that service was had on a "business agent of the defendant,
resident in the State" without considering the existence vel non of juris-
diction-creating acts. The defendant's insistence that there was no con-
nexite was brushed aside by the statement that "there is nothing
presented which would show that the cause of action did not arise out of
the activity of the [defendant] in Florida,"'24 as if there were a presump-
tion in favor of connexite.
As already indicated, the requirement of connexite does not apply
to cases within the scope of the Simari Amendment.2 5 The statute pro-
vides that a foreign corporation having "a business office within the state
and . .. actually engaged in the transaction of business therefrom" is
amenable to local jurisdiction without the necessity that such action
"shall have arisen out of any transaction or operation connected with or
incidental to the business being transacted within the state."' 26 In the
119. 293 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
120. Id. at 54.
121. 208 So.2d 873 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968). See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
122. 290 F. Supp. 240 (S.D. Fla. 1967). See note 117-18 supra and accompanying text.
123. 207 So.2d 294 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
124. Id. at 295.
125. FLA. STAT. § 48.081(5) (1967); Survey III, at 525.
126. Id.
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previously mentioned Donnelly case,127 the court felt it "necessary to
consider the alternative method employed by the Plaintiff to obtain
jurisdiction over Kellogg Company, under section 48.081, Florida Stat-
utes."12 The consideration of the Simari Amendment was misplaced,
however, since at the time of the accident the Simari Amendment was
not yet in force and, according to Florida law, jurisdictional statutes
have no retroactive effect. 12 9
This invites a general discussion of interrelations between the juris-
diction-creating acts and the qualifications of persons who under the
statues may be served on behalf of the corporate defendant. These quali-
fications also use, in some instances, the activities within the state of the
persons to be served as determinative factors.
In view of some recent opinions, it seems appropriate to bring the
classroom into the law review. Historically, jurisdiction was-and is still
being-perfected by service on the defendant found within the forum's
territory (at least in actions in personam). Properly analyzed, such
service contains two elements: 1) the jurisdiction-creating act, consisting
of the court's adjudicatory power over the defendant for the purposes of
the particular action; and 2) providing the defendant, in this case uno
actu, with notice about the action coupled with an order to appear and
defend. Once jurisdiction was expanded to include defendants not physi-
cally available to capias, the former unity of the act of service disinte-
grated into two phases: 1) the jurisdiction-creating acts on the part of
the non or no longer present defendant; and 2) a need for notice to him
about the action. Consequently, in these cases proper service does not
perfect jurisdiction unless it is founded on the jurisdiction-creating acts
on the part of the defendant. In the words of a recent case: "Effective
service of process is first conditioned on the power of the court properly
to acquire jurisdiction over a defendant.'1 0
The difference between these two phases of perfecting jurisdiction
under the long-arm statutes is clearly visible in light of controlling con-
stitutional standards. While standards with regard to jurisdiction follow
the development from International Shoe' to McGee 8 2 to Hanson88 and
127. Donnelly v. Kellogg Co., 293 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Fla. 1968). See notes 87-89 and
accompanying text.128. 293 F. Supp. at 55. The premise used by the court, however, that the "Fifth
Circuit has recently considered the connexity requirement and the so-called Simari Amend-
ment" in Woodham v. Northwestern Steel & Wire Co., 390 F.2d 27, 29 (5th Cir. 1968), is
untenable, since there the federal court sidestepped the requirement of connexity by using
improperly, as will be shown later, the back door of Florida Statutes section 48.081.
129. Cf. State ex rel. Riverside Bank v. Green, 101 So.2d 805 (Fla. 1958).
130. McNeely v. Clayton & Lambert Mfg. Co., 292 F. Supp. 232, 235 (D. Minn. 1968).
In addition to the requisite jurisdictional "basis", the second requirement for the
exercise of in personam jurisdiction is that a reasonable method be used to notify a
defendant of the proceedings and that he be given a reasonable opportunity to
be heard,
Franklin National Bank v. Krakow, 295 F. Supp. 910, 919 (D.D.C. 1969).
131. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
132. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
133. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Survey I, at 281.
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express a combination of minimum contacts, fair play, and substantive
justice, the constitutional standards testing the adequacy of service, for
the purpose of notice, require only a "reasonable method for apprising
such an absent party of the proceedings against him,' 114 or, as expressed
in a later opinion, notice must be "reasonably calculated under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."'3 5
A brief survey of pertinent statutory provisions also will show the
differences between the jurisdiction-creating acts and the requirements on
the part of persons qualified to accept service. Limiting examples to those
involving corporate defendants, it is evident that service, according to
Florida Statutes section 48.081 (1) (a) to (c), may be had on top corporate
officers, i.e., president, vice-president, or other heads of the corporation;
on the cashier, treasurer, secretary, or general manager; or on any direc-
tor, irrespective of the nature or the purpose of their presence in the state
on the assumption that, in view of their position of trust, they will
forward the process to the proper corporate authorities. The statute
exhibits a different attitude with regard to lesser officers or mere agents
of the corporation. In these cases, their residence in the state is required
or they must be "transacting business in this state" on behalf of the de-
fendant. This activity must increase the probability that they commun-
icate with the proper corporate officers.
With all this hornbook wisdom in mind, it is not difficult to discuss
the interrelations between jurisdiction-creating acts on the part of the
corporate defendant and qualifications required from some officers and
agents when they are to be used as agents for service. The requirements
imposed on agents for service do not replace or modify jurisdiction-
creating acts required on the part of the corporate defendant. This basic
principle was disregarded in Woodham v. Northwestern Steel & Wire
Co.136 The court bypassed section 47.16(1), the then valid Florida stat-
ute defining jurisdiction-creating activities, including connexite, by turn-
ing directly to the statute governing the second phase of perfecting
jurisdiction, namely service. Not finding the requirement of connexite in
the activity supposedly qualifying an agent for accepting service, the
court held the service of process to be sufficient by itself. In so doing,
the court relied on H. Bell & Associates, Inc. v. Keasbey & Mattison
Co. '3 not only to distinguish it from Zirin 1 8 but also to hold that service
in its notice-giving function was sufficient to perfect jurisdiction irre-
spective of the lack of required jurisdiction-creating acts on the part of
the defendant. However, the reliance on Bell is misplaced not only in
view of the analysis given above but also because it shows a lack of
knowledge of Florida law. Bell was strongly criticized in subsequent
134. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 464 (1940).
135. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
136. 390 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1968).
137. 140 So.2d 125 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
138. Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 128 So.2d 594 (Fla. 1961).
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decisions, and was expressly declined in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v.
Simari.1" In Simari the Florida Supreme Court was faced with service on
the district manager of the foreign corporate defendant and had to de-
termine the effects of service upon him according to section 47.17(5) of
the Florida Statutes. The supreme court emphatically maintained the
requirement of connexite as part of the jurisdiction-creating activity,
adding that:
It is true that the Zirin decision dealt in terms only with Sec.
47.171, whereas the court below held that service herein was
authorized by both that section and Sec. 47.17. However, the
subparagraph (5) of Sec. 47.17, which is applicable here, con-
tains the same language that was construed in Zirin; there is
therefore no reason why the same condition should not apply to
service attempted under Sec. 47.17.140
The ruling in Woodham'4' was followed in Hoffman v. Air India.4
involving a claim arising from an airplane crash in France. Again, the
court dispensed with the requirement of connexite in view of service on
a business agent, resident of this state. The court did not strengthen its
decision by concluding that "the Florida arm, short or long, is long
enough to reach the one-third mile from the United States Courthouse,
300 N.E. First Avenue, Miami, to nearby 100 Biscayne Boulevard,
North."'4 Alas, it is not a question of geography but one of law.
All this discussion is, at present, mostly of theoretical interest since
the Simari Amendment 44 has-subsequently to both Woodham and
Hoffman-dispensed with the requirement of connexity in regard to
corporate defendants involved in jurisdictional acts that the amendment
defines. In any case, the very existence of the amendment proves that the
ruling in both federal cases is erroneous.
Other cases dealing with service correctly denied effect to the mere
fact that service was performed according to former Florida Statutes
section 47.17 without the concomitant jurisdiction-creating acts. As al-
ready reported, lack of connexite was fatal in the Sausman145 case, as
139. 191 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1966); Survey II, at 504; Survey III, at 523.
140. Id. at 428. A federal court sitting in Florida found that "the statutory require-
ment that the cause of action arise out of or to be incidental to the foreign corporation's
Florida activities has recently been re-affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court in three cases:
Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co. . . .; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Simari . . .; and Giannini
Controls Corp. v. Eubanks ... ," Federal Ins. Co. v. Michigan Wheel Co., 267 F. Supp. 639,
640 (S.D. Fla. 1967), and added that:
Although Florida may have McGee-declared constitutional power . . . to flex its
jurisdictional muscles more strongly, it has chosen, by its legislature and its
Supreme Court, not to do so and has firmly established the above limitation on its
long arm statute. This Court is bound by that choice.
141. Woodham v. Northwestern Steel & Wire Co., 390 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1968).
142. 393 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968).
143. Id. at 509.
144. FLA. STAT. § 48.081(5) (1967).
145. Sausman Div. Invs., Inc. v. Cobbs Co., 208 So.2d 873 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
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was lack of jurisdictional acts in Goffer v. Weston.'46 In the previously
mentioned case of Donnelly v. Kellogg Company,'14 7 service of the agent
of the defendant's local subsidiary was held ineffective since both the
subsidiary and the parent company acted as "independent, viable con-
cerns." A similar question was before the federal court in Hermetic Seal
Corporation.4" There the court held that the existence of a mere parent-
subsidiary relationship was insufficient to uphold service on the sub-
sidiary as being effective against the parent corporation.
Persons qualified to accept service on behalf of the foreign corporate
defendant are listed in section 48.081 of the Florida Statues. They are
amenable to service only in the descending order of the classes established
there. It is well accepted that:
a return showing service upon an inferior officer or agent or a
corporation, in order to bind the corporation, must show the
absence of all officers of a superior class designated in the
statute as those upon whom service shall be had, before resort
is had to service upon one of the inferior class is a condition
precedent to the validity of service upon a member of an infe-
rior class.1
49
Following this rule, the court in Pentecostal Holiness Church, Inc. v.
Mauney" ° held service according to Florida Statutes section 48.081(2)
to be valid since "there was sufficient evidence before the lower court
from which it might reasonably be found that there were no members of
any superior class to be served in the State of Florida at the time of
service of process."' 51
The underlying ranking also appeared in the previously discussed
Woodhaml5" opinion. The court correctly noticed that the old section
47.17(1) to (4) of the Florida Statutes "provides for service upon cer-
tain named corporate officers in descending order of management re-
sponsibility," adding that paragraph (4) "allows service to be made on
a resident business agent if none of the corporate officials named in the
preceding sections are present in the state."' 53 However, it does not appear
that such a finding was ever made.
In attempting to bring some order into the statutory chaos dealing
with service, the second phase of perfecting jurisdiction over to non-
146. 217 So.2d 896 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
147. 293 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
148. 290 F. Supp. 240 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
149. Largay Enterprises, Inc. v. Berman, 61 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1962) ; cf. Drew Lumber Co.
v. Walter, 45 Fla. 252, 34 So. 244 (1903).
150. 220 So.2d 25 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
151. Id. at 26.
152. 390 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1968).
153. Id. at 29.
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resident business through long-arm statutes, 54 the following dismal
picture emerges:
(1) Process against individuals "not residing or having his or
their principal place of business in this state" who engage in
business, may be served "on the person who is in charge of
any business in which the defendant is engaged within the state
at the time of service, including agents soliciting orders for
goods, wares, merchandise, or services" according to Florida
Statutes section 48.071, on the secretary of state.'55
(2) Partnerships "not residing or having .. . their principal
place of business in this state" may be served like individuals
according to Florida Statutes section 48.071 quoted under (1).
Another alternative, available in Florida Statutes section
48.181(1) is service on the secretary of state as agent of "co-
partnerships or any other type of association, who are residents
of any other state or country."
For foreign limited partnerships a special provision is
available. They may be served according to section 622.04 of
the Florida Statutes on "any general partner found in Flor-
ida;" in case "no general partner can be found in Florida,
service of process may be effected upon the secretary of state as
agent of said limited partnership as provided in § 48.181,"
whatever this reference may mean.
(3) Foreign unincorporated associations shall maintain "an
office for the service of process" and appoint "a resident agent
upon whom process may be served."' 50 In addition, service may
be had on the secretary of state according to section 48.181 of
the Florida Statutes assuming that such association falls within
the term of "any other type of association which is a resident of
any other state or country." The latter alternative is not covered
by Florida Statutes section 622.02.
(4) Foreign corporations which have not qualified to engage in
local business may be served on the secretary of state according
to section 48.181 (1) of the Florida Statutes. A new paragraph,
section (2), was added to this section in 1967 providing that
"if a foreign corporation has a resident agent or officer in the
state, process shall be served on the resident agent or officer."
It would seem that this provision limits the availability of the
secretary of state to situations where no such officers or agents
are available for service.
A second alternative is offered in section 48.081 of the
154. Cf. Survey III, at 526, for an outline of jurisdiction-creating facts. It is self-
evident that nonresident individual corporate officers and stockholders cannot be served
through service on agents acting for local corporations. Meiselman v. McKnight, 226 So.2d
437 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
155. FLA. STAT. §§ 48.161(1), 48.181 (1967).
156. FLA. STAT. § 622.04 (1967).
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Florida Statutes. Agents for service of process are available in
the descending order established by the statute.'57 Difficulties
are bound to arise as to how to accommodate the new Florida
Statutes section 48.181(a). A similar question will arise from
section 48.081(3), providing that "as an alternative to all of the
foregoing, process may be served on the agent designated by the
corporation under § 48.091," an alternative not available
against nonqualifying foreign corporations.
Third, the Simari Amendment" 8 has introduced still an-
other mode of service on corporations within the scope of the
Amendment by providing that service may be had "upon any
officer or business agent resident in the state." The statute adds,
in language lacking clarity, that such service "may personally
be made, pursuant to this section." There will also be questions
regarding the relationship between this paragraph (5) and the
provisions of paragraph (1). Finally, are all these provisions
"cumulative to all existing laws" as provided in Florida Stat-
utes section 48.22?
(5) Unauthorized foreign insurance companies and service on
them is discussed in Chapter II § A(4) infra.
(6) There are additional service rules applicable to service on
special types of corporate defendants, among them foreign
building and loan associations, 15 9 nonprofit corporations (schol-
arship funds) 60 and agricultural cooperative marketing associa-
tions.'6'
4. UNAUTHORIZED FOREIGN INSURERS
Locally authorized "foreign or alien" insurers appoint the Commis-
sioner of Insurance as their sole agent for service. The authority of
the Commissioner is retained "as long as there is outstanding in this
state any obligation or liability of the insurer resulting from its insurance
transactions therein."' 62 Unauthorized insurers, however, as defined in
section 624.09(2) of the Florida Statutes are amenable to local juris-
diction on the strength of jurisdiction-creating acts listed in Florida
157. FLA. STAT. § 48.081(1)(a) to (d) (1967). FLA. STAT. § 608.21, as amended in 1969,
allows Florida corporations to merge or consolidate with corporations organized under the
laws "of any other state, territory, possession or jurisdiction of the United States," provided
their laws permit consolidation or merger, adding that such "agreement shall also contain
such other facts as shall be required to be set forth in articles of incorporation by the
laws of the jurisdiction which is stated therein to be the domicile of the consolidated or
merged corporation and which can be stated in the case of consolidation or merger." Cf.
Damon Alarm Corp. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 304 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
158. FLA. STAT. § 48.081(5) (1967), added a section dealing mainly with modes of
service, thus being the only provisions also containing a rule establishing jurisdiction-creating
facts.
159. See ch. II, § A(9) infra.
160. FLA. STAT. § 617.80 (1967).
161. FLA. STAT. § 618.26 (1967).
162. FLA. STAT. § 624.0221(1) (1967).
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Statutes section 626.0505, including connexite, with service of process
available according to section 626.0506, cumulative with other modes.
No recent cases have been reported dealing with this kind of long-arm
statute.
5. NONRESIDENT CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS AND SOLICITORS
Since the amendment was enacted in 1967,163 no new developments
have occurred.
6. NONRESIDENT PARTNERSHIPS
A brief outline of service provisions was already given. It may only
be added that the amenability to the Florida courts of a New York
limited partnership prior to the enactment of section 520.49 and para-
graph (3) of section 48.061 of the Florida Statutes was litigated as a
full faith and credit issue in New York.164
7. FOREIGN LAND DEVELOPERS
The jurisdiction of Florida courts established in Florida Statutes
section 478.27, enacted in 1967,165 may be affected by interstate trans-
actions falling within the scope of the Federal Interstate Land Sales
Full Disclosure Act of 1968.60 Section 1719 of the Act provides:
(a) The district courts of the United States .. . shall have
jurisdiction of offenses and violations under this chapter and
under rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary, and
concurrent with the state courts, of all suits in equity and
actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created
by this chapter.
In addition to venue provisions which follow, this section prohibits
removal of cases from state to federal courts "except where the United
States or any officer or employee of the United States in his official
capacity is a party."' 7
8. FOREIGN NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS
Even thought section 617.11 of the Florida Statutes provides that
corporations "incorporated under the laws of any other state or ter-
ritory" may file with the Secretary of State a copy of their charter, the
statute does not provide for service of process. In a recent action' 68
163. See Survey III, at 528.
164. Esser v. Cantor, 55 Misc. 2d 235, 284 N.Y.S.2d 914 (Civ. Ct. 1967).
165. See Survey III, at 528.
166. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (1969).
167. Id.
168. Indian Lake Club v. Hainsworth, 212 So.2d 915 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
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against a Florida nonprofit corporation some of its nonresident officers
were served, apparently according to Florida Statutes section 48.181.
The court held1 69 that the nonresident "secretary-treasurer and directors
of an association of owners of lots in Florida, the co-trustee of a fund
for the benefit of its members, are all amendable to the jurisdiction of
our courts in a controversy arising out of this matter.' 7 0
9. FOREIGN SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
The 1969 legislature amended chapters 665, 666 and 667 of the
Florida Statutes dealing with corporations which qualify as savings and
loan associations. These foreign associations are defined in section 50(1)
as
any person, firm, company, association, fiduciary, partnership
or corporation, by whatever name called, actually engaged in
the business of savings association, which is not organized
under the provisions of this act or the laws of the United States,
as now or hereafter amended, the principal business office of
which is located outside the territorial limits of this state.'
In order to "do any business . . . within this state or maintain an
office within this state for the purpose of doing such business," the
foreign association must secure permission from the State Comptroller.
There are certain activities which are not considered as doing business
and they are listed in paragraph (4). In regard to jurisdiction and
service paragraph (5) provides as follows:
Any foreign association or federal association described in
subsection (4) which engages in any of the activities described
in paragraph (a) thereof pursuant to the provisions of this sec-
tion shall in any connection therewith be subject to suit in the
courts of this state and the citizens of this state, and service on
such association shall be effected by serving the secretary
of state of this state, provided that the provisions of this section
shall have no other application to the question of whether any
foreign association or federal association is subject to service
of process and suit in this state as a result of the transaction
of business or other activities in this state.17 2
It may be gleaned from this deplorable language that the actions under
this section are available only to Florida citizens, that connexite is
required, and that some kind of saving clause was attempted.
169. The court relied on the authority of State ex rel. Weber v. Register, 67 So.2d 619
(Fla. 1953).
170. Indian Lake Club v. Hainsworth, 212 So.2d 915, 916 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
171. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-39, § 50(1)-(2).
172. Id. at § 50(5).
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10. FOREIGN DEALERS IN SECURITIES
Since the Uniform Sale of Securities Act 73 not only remained in
force but takes precedence over the Uniform Commercial Code,' 74 its
provisions should be quoted. In regard to jurisdiction, section 517.25 of
the Florida Statutes provides:
When not in conflict with the constitution or laws of the
United States, the courts of this state have the same jurisdiction
over civil suits instituted in connection with the sale or offer of
securities under any laws of the United States as they have
under similar circumstances under the laws of the state.
As to service, Florida Statutes section 517.10 provides that an issuer
or registered dealer, as defined in Florida Statutes section 517.02(4)
and (5), not domiciled in Florida, shall file an irrevocable written con-
sent that:
in suits, proceedings and actions growing out of the violation
of any provision of this chapter, the service on the chairman
of the Securities Commission . . . of any notice, process or
pleading therein, authorized by the laws of this state, shall be
as valid and binding as if due service had been made on the
issuer.
A venue provision is provided by Florida Statutes section 517.10(2).
B. Jurisdiction In Rem and Quasi In Rem
"As a general proposition, jurisdiction is either in rem, quasi in rem,
or in personam. The former two are based on the location of property
within the jurisdiction of the state while the latter is traditionally
grounded upon personal service within the state."' 75 Starting from here
with this general proposition, the court in Cooper v. Gibson 76 tackled
the problem posed by an action brought by county commissioners to
enjoin the nonresident defendants from maintaining a junkyard in
violation of a county zoning resolution. The court classified the remedy,
available under Florida laws ch. 63-1716 as a personal one and not
in rem, and held that the constructive service authorized in chapter 49
of the Florida Statutes was unavailable and personal service necessary.
In so doing, the court distinguished Vanstone v. Whitelaw,'1 77 involving
abatement of a nuisance. In the opinion of the court "it did not appear
[in Vanstone] that no relief sought under the complaint could be
granted on constructive service." The Cooper court added that the
173. FLA. STAT. § 517 (1967). Cf. Southern Brewing Co. v. May, 122 Fla. 443, 165 So.
627 (1936).
174. FLA. STAT. § 680.10-104(2) (1967).
175. Cooper v. Gibson, 208 So.2d 117, 118 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
176. Id.
177. 196 So.2d 425 (Fla. 1967) ; Survey III, at 529.
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court in Vanstone held that suit "could not be terminated merely
because certain of the remedies requested might exceed the jurisdiction
acquired through constructive service."' s Further, the court concluded
that "had [the] injunction been the only relief prayed for, constructive
service would not have sufficed," and observed that the dissent in
Vanstone differed from the majority only on the question of "whether
or not the complaint did in fact seek nonpersonal relief and, if so,
whether the fact permitted a wait-and-see approach to dismissal on
jurisdictional grounds."'7 9
An action by a resident stockholder in a closely held Florida
corporation against the other (nonresident) stockholder to determine
the ownership of certain shares of stock was characterized in Brown v.
Blake' as a suit quasi in rem, thus permitting substituted service under
Florida Statutes section 48.01. The court simply held that such a suit
Cover agreements entered into in Florida as to the delicate balance of
majority ownership of this Florida corporation"' 81 was a suit quasi in
rem.18
2
C. Forum Non Conveniens
Some of the fundamental considerations involved in the doctrine of
forum non conveniens'1s were elaborated in Adams v. Seaboard Coast
Line Railroad Company.'"" There the court distinguished between the
primary ("ultimate") and secondary factors to be weighed by a court
exercising discretion in using the doctrine. The primary factors restrict-
ing the applicability of the doctrine are that both parties to the action
must be nonresidents and that the cause of action must arise outside
of the state. Only if both circumstances are present may the court
consider secondary grounds. Some of these secondary grounds are pos-
sible forum shopping, undue harassment of the defendant by use of a
remote court, and convenience of parties and witnesses. In the present
case the court found that the defendant, a Virginia corporation, main-
tained its official headquarters and principal place of business in Florida.
In view of this fact the appellate court treated the defendant "as if it
were a citizen of Florida"'85 and reversed the dismissal of the suit.
178. Cooper v. Gibson, 208 So.2d 117, 119 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
179. Id.
180. 212 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
181. Id. at 49.
182. New prospects have been opened in Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc. 411 F.2d
812 (2d Cir. 1969), Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968); Varady v.
Margolis, 303 F. Supp. 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Victor v. Lyon Asso's., Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 694, 234 N.E.2d 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d
424 (1967); Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633
(1967); and Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
183. See Survey III, at 530.
184. 224 So.2d 797 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969); cf. Ganem v. Issa, 225 So.2d 564 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1969).
185. 224 So.2d at 802.
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Even though the plaintiff was a resident of Georgia and the cause of
action arose outside of Florida, the court did not apply forum non
conveniens because the election by the plaintiff of a Florida court did
not constitute harassment or forum shopping.
In an action against the same corporate defendant, other factors
ruled out the forum non conveniens doctrine. In Bell v. Seaboard Coast
R.R., s6 the court felt that the Florida Constitution guaranteed access to
courts as did Florida's public policy in accordance with principles
adopted by the United States Supreme Court. The court held that a
Florida based corporation simply could not invoke the doctrine since
it failed to demonstrate
sufficient expenses or inconvenience or harassment to outweigh
the substantial right of the initial selection of venue [sic] that
the federal and state laws accord to the plaintiff. Distance per
se is not alone sufficient. The affidavits show that employees
and affiliated physicians of the defendant may ride defendant's
regularly scheduled trains, without additional cost to defendant,
to any point where litigation may be brought against the
defendant. Parenthetically, the court will note that no claim is
made that this defendant is vexatiously exposed to the "whole-
sale importation" of actions similar to this, nor is there any
claim that this particular case is not filed in good faith or is
filed for ulterior reasons of any kind.'
The operation of the doctrine on the international level was tested
in Faulkner v. S.A. Empresa de Viaco Airea Rio Grandense.188 The court
of appeals affirmed dismissal of a tort action brought by nonresident
administrators and next of kin against the air carrier and the manufac-
turer for damages arising from an accident in Peru. The court found
that the plaintiffs, in addition to being nonresidents "had no contact
with this country; they did not purchase their tickets here; their
journeys were solely outside of the United States . ,,."I For these
reasons the court found "no abuse of discretion in the trial judge
dismissing the action upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens,"'' 9
noticing that the plaintiffs also had an identical action pending in the
New York courts.
D. Access to Courts
Foreign corporate plaintiffs may be denied the right to appear in
local courts as plaintiffs unless they qualify to engage in local business.
186. 31 Fla. Supp. 129 (Cir. Ct. 1968); cf. Gentry v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
27 Fla. Supp. 143 (Dade County Cir. Ct. 1966).
187. 31 Fla. Supp. 131 (Dade County Cir. Ct. 1968); cf. Ganem v. Issa, 225 So.2d 564
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
188. 222 So.2d 805 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
189. Id. at 806.
190. Id.
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The access of foreign corporations to courts is regulated by Florida
Statutes section 613.04.
The failure of any such foreign corporation to comply with the
provisions of this chapter shall not affect the validity of any
contract with such foreign corporation, but no action shall be
maintained or recovery had in any of the courts of this state by
any such corporation, or its successors or assigns, so long as
such foreign corporation fails to comply with the provisions of
this chapter.
This statute was discussed in three recent cases. In Belair Associates
v. Glaros-Carpenter Drug Co.,' 91 a nonqualifying Pennsylvania corpora-
tion brought an action against a domestic corporation to recover the
value of three acceptances for goods sold and delivered by a New Jersey
corporation, the plaintiff's assignor. On the authority of Rubin v.
Kapell,'92 the court held that the prohibition contained in Florida
Statutes section 613.04 does not apply for the following three reasons:
first, the transaction was interstate in nature; second, the suit was for
"debts due a foreign corporation for goods sold;"'9' and third, it
was a single transaction. A corollary case is Kar Products, Inc. v.
Acker "'94 in which the fact that the cause of action did not arise from
interstate commerce was decisive. The nonqualifying foreign corporation
sought to enforce in the Florida courts an agreement not to compete.
The suit was held to be barred by the statute and the fact that the
cause of action did not arise from interstate commerce was decisive
of the statute's application. In a carefully written opinion, reading
constitutional limitations into the statute, the court found, first, that the
claim did not involve an "action for goods sold in interstate commerce"
which would prevent the "imposition of unreasonable conditions on
such right, such as the requirement that the nonresident creditor
qualify to do business in the state as a requisite to maintaining an
action in the courts of the state," since this would operate as a "burden
and restraint upon interstate commerce," 95 The second question is
whether or not the fact that the transaction involved is not interstate
in nature will prevent the nonqualifying corporate plaintiff from main-
taining this suit without first complying with requirements set out in
chapter 613 of the Florida Statutes. The court answered in the negative
on the ground that this statute does not preclude the plaintiff from
seeking the adjudication of its rights in the court of his state, which is
191. 212 So.2d 903 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968); cf. Stafford-Higgins Indus. v. Gaytone
Fabrics, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
192. 105 So.2d 28 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958); cf. Overstreet v. Frederick B. Cooper Co., 134
So.2d 225 (Fla. 1961); Schwartz v. Frango Co., 44 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1950).
193. Belair Ass'n v. Glaros-Carpenter Drug Co., 212 So.2d 903, 905 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
194. 217 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969); cf. Frantz v. McBee Co., 77 So.2d 796
(Fla. 1955).
195. Id. at 597.
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acquired under the Federal Constitution or laws in interstate commerce.196
The third, and final question of whether the claim underlying the
plaintiff's demand is one "acquired under the Federal Constitution or
laws in interstate commerce,"'" o was answered in the negative'98 on the
ground that the plaintiff who "seeks enforcement of a private right
growing out of a contract of employment between it and the appellee
resident of Jacksonville, Florida,"'99 cannot maintain the action "without
first complying with the mandatory provisions of Florida Statutes
Chapter 613, F.S.A."2 °°
In Tornado Southern, Inc. v. Harry's Auto Parts, Inc.,20 1 plaintiff
was a foreign trustee in bankruptcy of a nonqualifying foreign corpo-
ration. The court held that the statute did not apply because:
The purpose and intent of the statute is penal in nature directed
against foreign corporations doing business in this state without
complying with the state law and the clause "or its successors
or assigns" was to prevent an evasion of the statute by subter-
fuge, but such statute has no application to trustees in bank-
ruptcy under the federal law. A trustee in bankruptcy under
federal law acquires title to the bankrupt's estate by opera-
tion of law and the language of the statute "or its successors
or assigns" is not comprehensive of trustees in bankruptcy
in the federal system or vendees claiming through such a
trustee." 2
Nonqualifying foreign corporations may not only be deprived of
access to courts; the statute also imposes penalties for unauthorized
engagement in local business."' There are statutory exceptions, however,
which grant such foreign corporations the privilege to engage in certain
carefully listed transactions with impunity.0 4 Nevertheless, such activ-
ities may bring the corporations within the scope of one or another type
of long-arm statutes. It should be added that some or all of these lim-
itations regarding access to courts by corporations established in other
countries may have to yield to contrary treaty provisions."'
196. Id. at 598.
197. Id.
198. The court based its holding on Eli Lilly & Co. v. Savy-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S.
276 (1961).
199. Kar Products, Inc. v. Acker, 217 So.2d 595, 598 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969) ; cf. Kirkeby-
Natus Corp. v. Campbell, 210 So.2d 103 (La. 4th Cir. 1968); Humboldt Foods, Inc. v.
Massey, 297 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Miss. 1968); Gates v. Green, 214 So.2d 828 (Miss. 1968).
200. Id.
201. 222 So.2d 29 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969); cf. Waterman Bic-Pen Corp. v. Mancraft
Exhibitors Service, Inc., 30 Fla. Supp. 110 (Dade County Civ. Ct. Rec. 1968).
202. Id. at 30.
203. FLA. STAT. § 48.091(5) (1967); FLA. STAT. § 613.11 (1967).
204. E.g., Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-39 (savings & loan associations); FLA. STAT. § 659.57
(1967) (foreign banking corporations).
205. S. BAYITCH, CONFLICT LAW IN UNITED STATES TREATIES 29 (1955). E.g., Con-
vention of Establishment Between the United States of America and France, Nov. 25, 1959,
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In some states, including an isolated provision in Florida,206
nonqualifying corporations may not enforce their locally concluded
contracts. For the most part, however, such discrimination has been
abolished. 07
The access to courts by refugees under the Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees20 8 is guaranteed:
(1) A refugee shall have free access to the courts of law on the
territory of all Contracting States.
(2) A refugee shall enjoy in the Contracting States in which
he has his habitual residence the same treatment as a national
in matters pertaining to access to the Courts, including legal
assistance and exemption from cautio judicatum solvi.
(3) A refugee shall be accorded in the matters referred to in
paragraph 2 in the countries other than in which he has habitual
residence the treatment granted to a national of his habitual
residence.20 9
E. Federal Courts
The area of jurisdiction based on federal questions was recently
expanded by two enactments. The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclo-
sure Act has already been mentioned.210 The other is the Consumer
Credit Protection Act of 1968.211 Civil liabilities arising from the
violation of consumer credit cost disclosure may be enforced against
the creditor by an action for which concurrent federal-state jurisdiction
is provided:
Any action under this section may be brought in any United
States district court, or in any other court of competent juris-
diction, within one year of the date of the occurence of the
violation.212
Among cases dealing with federal question jurisdiction, United
11 U.S.I. 4398, T.I.A.S. No. 4625, signed at Paris provides in art. III that nationals and
companies of either country "shall be accorded with respect to access to courts of justice ...
in all degrees of jurisdiction, both in pursuit and in defense of their rights. Companies of
either High Contracting Party not engaged in activities within the territories of the High
Contracting Party shall enjoy such access therein without any requirement of registration."
The control-test admissible under art. XIII might affect "advantages of the present Conven-
tion, except with respect to recognition of juridical status and access to the courts."
206. FLA. STAT. § 617.11 (1967); FLA. STAT. § 626.0502 (1967) (unauthorized insurers),
with exceptions in § 624.0201 and § 624.0202 (1967).
207. Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REv. 433
(1968); Note, Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Corporate Qualifications Statutes: An
Evaluation, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 117 (1963); cf. Stafford-Higgins Indus. v. Gaytone Fabrics,
Inc., 300 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
208. [1968] 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577.
209. Id. art. 16.
210. See note 172 supra.
211. 15 U.S.C. § 1601-77 (1969).
212. Id. § 1640(e).
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States v. Ray213 may be mentioned. In that case, the United States
enjoined imaginative developers from utilizing coral reefs situated on
the continental shelf off the eastern Florida coast. The challenge to
federal jurisdiction was met by the court's ruling that its jurisdiction
was based on the fact that the action was brought by the United States,214
that the controversy arose under the laws of the United States,215 and
that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act21 granted federal district
courts original jurisdiction over controversies arising out of or in con-
nection with any operations on the outer continental shelf.
In diversity cases, federal courts
look to state law to determine a foreign corporation's amen-
ability to suit within the state and thus in federal courts. A
state may choose not to exercise its full constitutional power in
this area and it may impose limitations beyond those of due
process. A federal court in a diversity case must abide by these
limitations.217
Consequently, the amenability to suit under state law becomes the
"threshold question to be decided by a federal court in a diversity
suit. ' 218 By comparison, the sufficiency of service is to be determined
by federal law.219 Some cases of this type have already been discussed.
Only a few dealing with other jurisdictional problems need be added.
In O'Donnell v. Dunspaugh-Dalton Foundation, Inc.,120 the federal court
held that it had no jurisdiction to impose a constructive trust upon the
assets of the defendant, a charitable trust, which was created and was
appointed a legatee by a will admitted to probate in a Florida state
court. Similarly, a federal court in Phoenix Insurance Company v.
Harby Marina, Inc.221' declined to exercise jurisdiction in an action for
213. 294 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
214. 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1964).
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964).
216. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (1964).
217. McNeely v. Clayton & Lambert Mfg. Co., 292 F. Supp. 232, 235 (D. Minn. 1968);
cf. Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1969).
218. Id. at 237. See Foster, Judicial Economy; Fairness and Convenience of Place of
Trial: Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Federal Courts, 47 F.R.D. 73 (1969).
219. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964) ; Jennings v. McCall
Corp., 320 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1963). But see Harry Winston, Inc. v. Waldfogel, 292 F. Supp.
473 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
220. 391 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1968).
221. 294 F. Supp. 663 (N.D. Fla. 1969). For an action to remove cloud on title under
the Swamp and Overflowed Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 982 (1964) dismissed for want of sub-
stantial federal question, see Mays v. Kirk, 414 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1969) ; cf. Copeland v.
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 414 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1969). For an action dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction in view of a final determination of a constitutional question submitted
and decided by state courts, see Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1969). But see
Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969), where injunctive relief was granted
against a state court for issuing injunction against picketing on the ground that the state
injunction was overbroad.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
declaratory judgment where the issue was being litigated in a Florida
state court.
An interesting jurisdictional question in connection with removal
arose in Bobby Jones Garden Apartments, Inc. v. F.R. Suleski.222 The
federal court was faced with a petition for removal of an action from a
Florida state court. The defendant alleged that the foreign corporate
defendant's local agent was fraudulently joined in order to prevent
diversity. The court believed the crucial point to be the existence vel
non of Florida law establishing the agent's liability for misrepresenting
and therefore "tangential to removability and hence jurisdiction."22
Since, as a general proposition, there can be "no fraudulent joinder
unless it is clear that there can be no recovery under the law of the
state on the cause alleged, or on the facts in view of the law, '224 the
court ruled that:
This is an Erie problem in part, but only part. In the usual
diversity situation a Federal Court, no matter how difficult
the task, must ascertain (and then apply) what the state law
is . . . . But here the question is whether there is arguably a
reasonable basis for predicting that the state law might impose
liability on the facts involved. If that possibility exists, a good
faith assertion of such an expectancy in a state court is not a
sham, is not colorable and is not fraudulent in fact or in law.225
Thus the court reached the crucial question of the existence of "a
reasonably good chance that Florida today will hold the agent to some
liability. '226 In so doing the court followed "Erie lights, of significant,
but not decisive, importance . . ." which it found "for a change, rather
bright. '22 7 After carefully exploring Florida law, the court found "a
reasonable possibility . . . that plaintiff could persuade Florida Courts
that he has a cause of action against the Agent ' 228 and denied removal,
adding; "thus requiring remand the case ends as it began: A Florida
suit involving Florida law to be determined by a Florida Court. 22 9
F. International Service of Process
Two areas of international civil litigation remain particularly unsat-
isfactory: letters rogatory and service of judicial documents. In regard
to the latter, improvements may be expected not only from domestic
legislation, represented by the Uniform Interstate and International
222. 391 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1968) ; cf. Atkins v. Schmutz mfg. Co., 401 F.2d 731 (4th
Cir. 1968).
223. Id. at 174.
224. Parks v. New York Times Co., 308 F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 1962).
225. Bobby Jones Garden Apts., Inc. v. Suleski, 391 F.2d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 1968).
226. Id. at 177.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 178.
229. Id. at 179. Federal jurisdiction involving unconstitutionality of the Florida vagrancy
statute, Lazarus v. Faircloth, 301 F. Supp. 266 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
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Procedure Law ° but also from the multilateral Convention on Service
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents (The Hague, 1965),31
ratified by the United States and a rather disappointing number of
other countries. In summary, the Convention applied to "civil or commer-
cial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial
document for service abroad."2" 2 Each contracting country designates
a central authority to receive such requests." ' In this country, a
declaration upon ratification of the treaty designates the United States
Department of State as the receiver of these requests.23 4 This Authority
will serve the document, or cause it to be served according to "its in-
ternal law for the service of documents in domestic actions, upon persons
who are within its territory" '235 or by a different method if it is not "in-
compatible with the law of the State addressed." 6 Moreover, each con-
tracting country is free to send documents through the mail or to "effect
service of judicial documents upon persons abroad, without application
of any compulsion, directly through its diplomatic or consular agents,"2"7
provided that the other country has not declared itself opposed to such
service and with the exception of service on a national of the country
from which the document comes. If the country where service is to be
performed does not object, judicial documents may be sent by mail or
served by "judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the
State of destination."'2 38 Any person "interested in a judicial proceeding"
may effect service "directly through the judicial officers, officials or other
competent persons of the State of destination."2 9 The country of desti-
nation may refuse to comply only "if it deems that compliance would
infringe its sovereignty or security."24 ° It may not refuse, however, on
the ground that "it claims exclusive jurisdiction over the subject-matter
of the action or that its internal law would not permit the action upon
which the application is based."24'
230. Adopted in Arkansas, Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma and the Virgin Islands.
231. [1969] 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638. Downs, The Effect of the Hague Conven-
tion on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial
Matters, 2 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 125 (1969). As of October 16, 1969, the Convention was
adopted by the United Kingdom, United Arab Republic, Denmark, Norway, Sweden,
Finland, Botswana, Barbados, and the United States (letter of the Netherlands Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, October 16, 1969).
232. Id. art. 1.
233. Id. art 2, para. 1.
234. A document entitled "Designations and Declarations Made on the Part of the
United States in Connection with the Deposit of the United States Ratification." It is not
referred to in the Presidential Proclamation nor has it any indication from what authority
it originates.
235. Art. 5(a) [1969] 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638.
236. Id. art. 5(b).
237. Id. art. 8.
238. Id. art. 10(b).
239. Id. art. 10(c).
240. Id. art. 13, para. 1.
241. Id. art. 13, para. 2.
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Unfortunately, the Convention went beyond its scope by reaching
into matters of default judgments recovered pursuant to service under
the Convention. On the basis of the declaration,2 42 the second paragraph
of article 15 applies in this country so that a judgment may be rendered,
if the defendant did not appear, "even if no certificate of service has
been received," provided
(a) the document was transmitted by one of the methods
provided for in this Convention,
(b) a period of time of not less than six months, con-
sidered adequate by the judge in the particular case, has elapsed
since the date of the transmission of the document,
(c) no certificate of any kind has been received, even
though every reasonable effort has been made to obtain it
through the competent authorities of the State addressed. 3
In any case, "the judge may order, in case of urgency, any provisional
or protective measures. 2 44 Whenever such judgment is entered against
a defendant who has not appeared, the judge may not, according to
the United States choice in the declaration, entertain an application
"to relieve the defendant from the effects of the expiration of the time
for appeal from the judgment" '24 5 if such application is filed
(a) after the expiration of the period within which the same
may be filed under the procedural rules of the court in which
the judgment has been entered, or
(b) after the expiration of one year following the date of the
judgment, whichever is later 2 4 6
provided
(a) the defendant, without any fault on his part, did not have
knowledge of the document in sufficient time to defend, or
knowledge of the judgment in sufficient time to appeal, and
(b) the defendant has disclosed a prima facie defense to the
action on the merits.247
III. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
As stated in a recent case, 248 "courts of one state within our
federal system are bound to give full faith and credit to the judgments
242. See note 234 supra.
243. Id. art. 15, para. 2(a)-(c).
244. Id. art. 15, para. 3.
245. Id. art. 16, para. 1.
246. Id. Declaration, para. (4).
247. Id. art. 16, para. 1(a) and (b) ; except judgments concerning status or capacity of
persons.
248. Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Krakow, 295 F. Supp. 910, 916 (D.D.C. 1969). For full
faith and credit given to state judgments in federal courts see First Am. Ins. Co. v. O'Connor,
392 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1968).
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of the courts of another," provided that the former court had "jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter or of the parties in the constitutional sense."
Therefore the clause "does not preclude an inquiry into the jurisdiction
of the court which pronounced the judgment," even if the record
"purports to show jurisdiction." '249 What counts is that the judgment-
rendering court has "properly claimed jurisdiction under its own law
in accordance with constitutional due process;" the latter factor makes
the "applicability and the effect of the full faith and credit clause ...
a matter to be determined as a matter of and according to federallaw.',,250
Among cases requiring Florida courts to give full faith and credit
to foreign judgments, the following are illustrative. In Hecht Rubber
Corporation v. Meckler, 5' the court recognized a New York money
judgment after rejecting the defendant's contention that the judgment
was void because of lack of jurisdiction in New York and because the
judgment was "tainted with fraud practiced by appellee upon the court
in procuring the judgment. 25 2 The first defense was disposed of by
finding that the New York court had jurisdiction under section 302 (a),
paragraph (1) of its Civil Practice Law.2 3 The second was rejected on
the ground that the proceedings in New York were "free from the taint
of fraud. 25 4 In a contrary decision, Barsotti v. Jaffe, 5 the Florida
court reversed a summary judgment for plaintiff relying on a New York
judgment for lack of jurisdiction in New York. The record, in the court's
opinion failed to "demonstrate that a material fact-the validity of the
alleged service upon the appellant-was not genuinely in issue. ' 21 6 In
another case,257 the court had to rule on the effect of a general release
after judgment. The court held that in a case of defendants jointly and
severally liable, a general release given one of them was full satisfaction
of the judgment against the others. Finally, a New York judgment which
confirmed an arbitration award requiring the liquidation of a Florida
corporation was held to qualify for full faith and credit in Mendelsund v.
Southern-Aire Coats of Florida, Inc.258
The fate of Florida judgments in other jurisdictions may be dem-
249. Id.
250. Holm v. Shilensky, 388 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 1968) ; cf. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 409 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1969).
251. 208 So.2d 838 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968) ; cf. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
409 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Puro v. Puro, 225 So.2d 462 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
252. Id. at 839; cf. Marotta v. Pittsburg, 27 Fla. Supp. 125 (Broward County Cir. Ct.
1966).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 840; cf. Horowitz v. United Investors Corp., 227 So.2d 719 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1969).
255. 216 So.2d 27 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
256. Id. at 28.
257. Movielab, Inc. v. Davis, 217 So.2d 890 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
258. 210 So.2d 229 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968), cert. denied, 225 So.2d 524 (Fla. 1969).
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onstrated by Esser v. Cantor.259 In that case, a New York court gave full
faith and credit to a Florida judgment against a limited partnership,
organized under the laws of New York, brought into a Florida court
under the general nonresident business statute. According to the evalu-
ation of the statute's constitutionality, the New York court found that
the "minimum contracts required by the Florida statute do not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,"2 ' and the defen-
dant was "given adequate notice of the action and reasonable time to
appear and defend." 26'
IV. THE ERIE-KLAXON DOCTRINE
A. General Problems
Following the guiding light of Erie262 and Klaxon,s65 federal courts
in diversity litigation get their bearings from the conflict law of the
forum and then apply the statutory and decisional law of the jurisdiction
so identified, domestic or foreign. Difficulties usually arise, however, on
the second step of the process involving the applicable state law. On
the one hand, federal courts are bound to apply, no matter how difficult
the task, "state law as it is [and] not as we might wish that it were. ' 264
On the other hand, there are situations where the controlling state law
cannot be ascertained or is simply nonexistent. For example, in cases
of first impression, federal judges, not being judges of the respective
states, frequently feel inhibited to create decisional state law even if
only for the case before them. "We [the federal judges] are compelled
to follow existing law and not shunt it aside in favor of a rule which we
might regard more just and flexible."265 Therefore, federal courts "bound
as they are by state law, must await change, not initiate it," and accept
and apply the existing state laws "with whatever shortcomings and con-
tradictions they may possess." '266 Their only consolation is to express a
"visionary hope" that the respective state courts will "some day toll the
knell of [the case's] parting day and grant it, at long last, a grateful
demise. ,287
At most, a federal judge may attempt to second-guess his brother
on the state bench. An "Erie-bound Court" may "make an educated
259. 55 Misc. 2d 235, 284 N.Y.S.2d 914 (Ci ,. Ct. 1967), aff'd, 55 Misc. 2d 720, 286
N.Y.S.2d 389 (1967).
260. Id. at 238, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
261. Id. For full faith and credit given by Louisiana to a judgment rendered by a
federal court sitting in Florida see Collector of Revenue v. Tenneco Oil Co., 206 So.2d 302
(La. App. 1968).
262. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
263. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
264. Sheppard Fed. Credit Union v. Palmer, 408 F.2d 1369 (5th Cir. 1969).
265. Bannowsky v. Krauser, 294 F. Supp. 1204, 1205 (D. Colo. 1969).
266. Mouton v. Sinclair Oil & Gas. Co., 410 F.2d 717, 725 (5th Cir. 1969).
267. Id.
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guess as to what the Florida court would decide if this case were pre-
sented to them." '268 In such a "perennial quandary of the Erie syndrome,
viz., [where] the application of state law . . . is vague and uncertain,
if not nonexistent," the court will "fall back on formulary surrogates
to account for our mysterious application of an uncoined code."269
Where the applicable state law "eludes the researcher, the [federal]
court must attempt to ascertain the policy inclination of the state's high-
est tribunal with regard to the matter in controversy. Failing that, the
court may assume that the state courts would adopt the rule which, in its
view, is supported by the thrust of logic and authority. 2 70 In a similar
vein, the same court of appeals ruled that whenever there are no Florida
cases directly on point "we must decide this case as we believe the
Florida courts would decide if confronted with these facts."1271
In any event, changes in state law should not be anticipated as
justification for sidestepping state law in force in favor of a better rule.
"It would be highly presumptuous for [a federal] court, sitting as a
state trial court in a diversity suit, to anticipate this change. ' 272 Instead,
the court's duty to "follow existing [state] law is . . . absolute and
[one] which prohibits a change of existing conflicts rules in advance of
action by the state courts," except maybe in a "particular instance
[where] the evidence of change might justify a projection. '27 3 A different
question arises where a change in the controlling state law in fact
occurred. 4
Nevertheless, even in diversity cases, federal law may prevail,
particularly in matters considered to be procedural. The rule that suffi-
ciency of evidence for submission to the jury is controlled by federal
and not state law was restated in Vandercook and Son, Inc. v. Thorpe 75
268. Trail Bldrs. Supply Co. v. Reagan, 409 F.2d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
of S. Ct. of Fla., 410 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1969).
269. Stool v. J.C. Penney Co. 404 F.2d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 1968).
270. id. at 563. The court continued:
It is nevertheless patent that any rule which we vicariously adopt on behalf of
the state courts will be substantially the product of conjecture. Accordingly,
we are hesitant to attempt to second-guess the district court which has already
ventured intrepidly into the phantom-law wonderland. Since our view of the state
law is probably as much a guess as the district court's, the latter cannot be
designated categorically as wrong. Ironically enough, however, the district court
can be erroneous. We cannot accept the premise that one guess is as good as another,
for that would effectively eliminate appellate review in a substantial portion of the
cases which come before this court. When a federal court of appeals is of the
opinion, as we are in this case, that the district court's view of the applicable
state law is against the more cogent reasoning of this best and most widespread
authority, it must reverse the judgment of the lower court.
271. International Erectors, Inc. v. Wilhoit Steel Erectors & Rental Serv., 400 F.2d
465, 467 (5th Cir. 1968).
272. Bannowsky v. Krauser, 294 F. Supp. 1204, 1205 (D. Colo. 1969).
273. Id. at 1205-206; cf. Development Corp. of America v. United Bonding Ins. Co.,
413 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1969).
274. American Acceptance Corp. v. Schoenthaler, 391 F.2d 64, 75 (5th Cir. 1968);
Tiernan v. Westext Transp., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1256, 1261 (D.R.I. 1969).
275. 395 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1968); cj. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Winnemore, 413 F.2d 858
(5th Cir. 1969).
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and Markham v. Holt .2 1 The same rule prevailed in Ricketson v.
Seaboard Airline Railroad Co. 2 1 which ruled on removing the case from
the jury.
A final question may be raised as to the precedent value of federal
rulings in matters of state law. Generally, federal courts give such rulings
the full effect of case law; so do state courts in many instances. This
practice, however, is not unopposed.
In Erie-bound cases, federal courts sitting in Florida apply Florida
substantive law, frequently without express reference to the Erie-Klaxon
doctrine. Such cases involve torts;279 contracts; 280 insurance; 21 interest
rates; 212 labor; 28  surety arrangements; 2 4  interests in land; 285 nego-
276. 409 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1969); cf. Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir.
1969); Vandercook & Son, Inc., v. Thorpe, 395 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1968); Helene Curtis
Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1968); Planters Mfg. Co. v. Protection Mut.
Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1967).
277. 403 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1968).
278. Peterson v. U-Haul Co., 409 F.2d 1174, 1177 (8th Cir. 1969).
279. Hester v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 412 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1969) (Florida law on
frauds applied); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (implied
warranty for cigarettes) ; Charleston Nat'l Bank v. Hennessy, 404 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1968)
(collision); Southland Corp. v. Venere, 404 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1968) (res ipsa loquitur);
Aerosonic Corp. v. Trodyne Corp., 402 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1968) (unfair competition);
Caswell v. Manhattan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 399 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1968) (libel);
Keating v. Jones Dev., Inc., 398 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1968) (swimming pool); Longbottom
v. Swaby, 397 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1968) (wrongful death statute); Bobby Jones Garden
Apts., Inc. v. F.R. Suleski, 391 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1968) (misrepresentation) ; Belli v.
Orlando Daily News, Inc., 389 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1968) (libel) Hertz Corp. v. Ralph M.
Parsons Co., 292 F. Supp. 108 (M.D. Fla. 1968) (joint tort-feasors).
280. Canada v. Allstate Ins. Co., 411 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1969) (commissions); Hunger-
ford Const. Co. v. Florida Citrus Expo., Inc., 410 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1969) (liquidated
damages); Roger Lee, Inc. v. Trend Mills, Inc., 410 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Brick &
Oklaloosa Title & Abstract Co., 404 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1968) (abstractor's liability) ; Inter-
national Erectors, Inc. v. Wilhoit Steel Erectors & R. Serv., 400 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1968)
(parol evidence); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 339 F.2d
854 (5th Cir. 1968) (contracts); Center Chem. Co. v. Auril, Inc., 392 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.
1968) (contracts).
281. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 412 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Travelers Ins. Co.
v. Davis, 411 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1969); Consolidated Systems, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 411
F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1969); Jefferson Realty v. Fidelty & Deposit, 410 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.
1969) ; Gulfstream Cargo, Ltd. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 409 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1969) ; American
Empire Ins. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 408 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Battisti v. Con-
tinental Cas. Co., 406 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1969); Commercial Union Ins. Co. of New York
v. Reichard, 404 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1968) ; American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Motta, 404 F.2d 167
(5th Cir. 1968); Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 402 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1968);
Moore v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 398 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1968); Wissner v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 395 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Seward v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 392 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1968); Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co. v. Renauart-Bailey-
Cheely Lumber & Supply Co., 392 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1968); Celanese, Coatings Co. v.
American Motorist Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 598 (S.D. Fla. 1969); Hershey v. Kennedy & Ely
Ins., Inc., 294 F. Supp. 554 (S.D. Fla. 1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 888; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mole,
291 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
282. American Accept. Corp. v. Schoenthaler, 391 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1968); Kellogg Co.
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 282 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
283. Ferguson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 400 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1968).
284. Continental Cas. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 403 F.2d 761 (5th Cir.
1968); United States v. Skipper Smith's Marina, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 408 (S.D. Fla. 1968);
Florida v. Marvin, 280 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
285. Gregory v. Lloyd, 284 Supp. 264 (N.D. Fla. 1968) (homestead).
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tiable instruments; 28 6 status of women; 217 and landlord and tenant rela-
tionships.88
State law controls where federal statutes refer to it, e.g., in the
Federal Tort Claims Act.289 In other situations there may be an interplay
between state and federal law when Florida law fills a gap in the federal
law2 ° or is determinative of state-created interests.29' There is, of course,
an alternative open to federal courts when faced with difficulties in
ascertaining state law-abstention with or without certification to state
courts.
B. Abstention
The equitable doctrine of abstention enables federal courts in di-
versity as well as in nondiversity cases to abstain from exercising their
adjudicatory function, either fully or partially. Only in rare cases do
these courts abstain so completely as to dismiss an otherwise properly
instituted action. In other cases, they may stay proceedings and send
parties to the state courts in order to secure an authoritative ruling by
state courts on points of state law. A federal court also may abdicate
its law-finding function in favor of the state courts and initiate steps to
obtain from courts an extra-procedural ruling on matters of state law.
Such certification procedure is available in Florida under Section 25.031
of the Florida Statutes.292
Lately, the United States Supreme Court has further clarified some
of the problems involved in abstention situations. In Zwickler v. Koota,
involving the constitutionality of a New York criminal statute, the
286. First Nat'l Bank v. Sogaard & Debo, Inc., 406 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1969).
287. Gaston v. Pittman, 285 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Fla. 1968) (Married Women Emancipa-
tion Act).
288. Precisionware, Inc. v. Madison County Tobacco Whse., Inc., 411 F.2d 42 (5th Cir.
1969). A ruling by the State Comptroller "may sometimes constitute the only 'law' of the
state . . . and we should follow it when, as here, it appears consistent with the policy of the
state statute." Dickinson v. First Nat'l Bank in Plant City, Plant City, Florida, 400 F.2d
548, 558 (5th Cir. 1968), appeal pending 393 U.S. 1079 (1969). For dismissal in diversity
litigation based on Florida law, see Webb v. Standard Oil Co., 414 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1969)
Equity Capital Co. v. Sponder, 414 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1969).
289. Adams v. United States, 411 F.2d 603 (5th Cir. 199) (aerial spraying) ; Emelwon,
Inc. v. United States, 391 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1968) (negligent spraying from air).
290. Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969)
(violation of SEC rule); York Corp. v. Brock, 405 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1969) (reorganiza-
tion) ; Webb's City, Inc. v. Remington Arms Co., 404 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1968) (retailer's
antitrust action) ; Miami Parts & Spring, Inc. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 402 F.2d 83 (5th
Cir. 1968) (release in federal antitrust action) ; United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hendry
Corp., 391 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1968) (Miller Act) ; J.J. Henry Co. v. United States, 411 F.2d
1246 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (classification of laborer).
291. United States v. Gurley, 415 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1969) (marital property interests)
Carver v. United States, 412 F.2d 233 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (Florida corporation) ; Willard v.
Petruska, 402 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1968) (liens); and Huxford v. United States, 299 F. Supp.
218 (N.D. Fla. 1969) (sale of timber).
292. See Survey III, at 537; Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law: An
Impractical Tool in the Hands of the Federal Courts, 23 U. MiAMI L. Rav. 717 (1969).
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Court held that the better way to deal with such cases is to retain
jurisdiction rather than to dismiss the case, repeating the principle that
the "judge-made doctrine of abstention sanctions escape only in narrowly
limited special circumstances.' 29 3 Nevertheless, the same Court preferred
dismissal in Provident Tradesmens Bank and Trust Co. v. Patterson294
when the same issue of state law was simultaneously presented to a
state court. In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co.,295 the Supreme
Court, faced with the far-reaching issue of whether coal mining was a
matter of public interest justifying the taking of land by eminent domain
in order to secure water for mining operations, held that the court below
should have stayed the proceedings and retained jurisdiction in view of
the fact that the issue was a truly new one and an action for declaratory
judgment was already pending in a New Mexico court. "Sound judicial
administration requires that the parties in this case be given the benefit
of the same rule of law which will apply to all other businesses and
landowners concerned with the use of this vital state resource."2 96
Limiting the discussion to diversity cases, it may be pointed out that
the difficulties in ascertaining the applicable state law may not be used as
justification for denial of justice. Consequently, federal courts have, in
regard to Florida law, two alternatives: to ascertain Florida law them-
selves or to certify the legal question to the Florida Supreme Court. As
shown in a previous survey, 9 7 courts have vacillated between both alter-
natives. The former appeals to their professional pride in being able to
deal with such an esoteric matter as Florida law, while the latter suits
pragmatical motives. Choice of the first alternative may be strengthened
by hidden doubts as to the intrinsic value of advisory opinions on certi-
fied questions since they do not measure up to the standards required for
binding stare decisis.
Generally, federal courts have found the Florida certification pro-
cedure effective and helpful. The court in Martinez v. Rodriquez29 8
extolled its virtues:
No matter how many Federal Judges, trial appellate, three-
Judge panel, or the full panoply of the court en banc, any de-
cision would have been an Erie-guess. Now the guesswork has
been eliminated, and we are quickly presented with a definitive
explication of Florida law.
There are, to be sure, purists who somehow feel that a
struggle of uncertainty leading even to the likelihood of an
erroneous but speedy result is better than the slight time it
293. 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
294. 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
295. 391 U.S. 593 (1968).
296. Id. at 594. For a recent discussion see Urbano v. Board of Managers of New Jersey
State Prison, 415 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1969).
297. Survey III, at 539.
298. 410 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1969).
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takes to get an authoritative answer. But so long as Florida
is with us and has this responsive mechanism that not only
lights our lights but keeps us straight at the same time, this
tribunal is grateful for the substitution of certainty for the
sometimes scholastic, always uncertain exploration into what
local judges would say they would say the local law is.""9
An equally favorable recognition was bestowed in Hopkins v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp." The federal court of appeals felt that even if the Florida
Supreme Court was divided as to what the Florida law was and one
opinion was superseded by another, the "value of this device is spec-
tacularly demonstrated." '' The opinion continues, "Florida's procedure
gives a clear, positive, final decisive answer," which, in the mind of the
court:
is not just a bright clear light showing the Erie-way, or a sign
post pointing an Erie direction. Not only is it all of these things,
it is much more. For it is what the law actually is on the precise
point presented to us and certified for answer. It is Florida law
binding on us as we perform our Erie role.5 °"
A specially concurring judge, however, raises doubts as to the validity
of the certification method and as to the "soundness of the enthusiastic
and emphatic statements in the opinion." 8' His reluctance is due to his
realization that while the federal court has jurisdiction over the parties
and the subject matter, the Florida Supreme Court has neither and,
consequently, has "no power to make or enforce any adjudication of the
controversy." The action of the Florida court, continues the same judge,
was "not an adjudication, since only the Federal court could enter and
enforce judgment. Hence, the action of the Florida court was not an
exercise of judicial power," but only an "expression of an opinion on the
law of Florida by judges well qualified to give an opinion," and as such
not "res judicata in the cause or as a judicial decision entitled to accep-
tance under the rule of stare decisis. 3 0 4
299. Id. at 730.
In the same vein, the dissenting judge in W.S. Ranch Co. v. Kaiser Steel Corp.,
388 F.2d 257, 264 (10th Cir. 1967) wrote that "more damage is done to the
states' jurisprudence and its policies by a headstrong, resolute, inflexible determina-
tion on the part of a federal court to barge ahead in a sort of ascetic, misguided
Winter Haven [320 U.S. 228 (1943)] impulse, than will likely result from the
slight delay occasioned by involving state adjudication of the controlling issues.
For the simple fact is that more and more federal courts are being overruled by
more state courts on local issues upon which such federal courts have undertaken
to read the Erie signs in the quest of the Winter Haven grail . . . . And the
experience in Florida demonstrates that state court reversals of Federal appellate
decisions occur both in appeals of state cases and on Clay certification [363
U.S. (1960)] to the Supreme Court of Florida, the latter with some spectacular
results. (footnotes ommitted).
• 300. 394 F.2d" 656 (5th Cir. 1968).
301. Id. See Survey III, at 544.
302. 394 F.2d at 657.
303. Id. at 658.
304. Id.
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As already indicated, difficulties may arise in Erie situations where,
during protracted litigations, state law not only changes, but the crucial
issues shift, appearing more clearly or in a different perspective. This
happened in Green v. American Tobacco Co.,'0 pending since 1957,
which involves a widow's claim for breach of implied warranty in the
sale of defendant's cigarettes smoked by her late husband. Recently, the
federal court of appeals reversed its prior decision °6 to reverse the judg-
ment for defendant by affirming en banc the lower court's decision 3 7 on
the opinion of the previously dissenting judges.""' As to the question
certified to the Florida Supreme Court regarding Florida's tort law, the
dissenting judges in the most recent decision felt that the question certified
was "too limited, too restrictive, too narrow" and added that it remains a
"mystery wrapped in an enigma why we did not recertify an appropriate
question."3 9 They further insisted that Florida had "the right to de-
termine for its ever increasing millions and for the millions of coveted
perennial visitors whether a product that subjects one in ten to the
terrible disease can ever be fit or wholesome, reasonably or otherwise,"
and rejected the idea that the "enlightened Supreme Court of Florida will
tolerate a commercial system that sells with impunity ostensibly in-
nocuous products, but which in fact have lethal consequences." 10 There-
fore, Florida should be "given the opportunity to fashion its own policy
standards through the available, workable mechanism of certification." ''
Being one of the "pedagogical purists' 3 12 this writer cannot help observ-
ing that as well meaning as these suggestions may be, the certification
procedure is not a law-making or policy-determining device but merely
a law-as-it-is declaring device, operating within strict statutory limits.
It is true that in most instances the certification procedure operates
smoothly. After the Florida Supreme Court answered 13 that the Florida
Death by Wrongful Act Statute does not apply to acts on Florida
navigable waters, the federal court affirmed dismissal. 4 In Martinez v.
Rodriquez,15 the question involved a father's claim for the death of his
minor son in view of the mother's contributory negligence. After the
answer from the Florida Supreme Court,1 6 the federal court again
affirmed the ruling of the trial court.3"7 It is indeed interesting that in
305. The most recent decision is 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969), with prior opinions listed
in footnotes.
306. Id.
307. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968).
308. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
309. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166, 1169 (5th Cir. 1969).
310. Id. at 1170.
311. Id.
312. See S.W. Ranch Co. v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 388 F.2d 257, 267 (10th Cir. 1968).
313. Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1968).
314. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 409 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 90 S. Ct.
1772 (1970).
315. 394 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1968).
316. Martinez v. Rodriquez, 215 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1968).
317. Martinez v. Rodriquez, 410 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1969).
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both cases the federal trial courts correctly ascertained Florida law. In
Gaston v. Pittman,18 the Florida Supreme Court answered in the affirma-
tive the question of a divorced woman's right of action against her former
husband for a tort committed by him prior to their marriage. 19 In
another case,3 20 a question involving the Workmen's Compensation Act
was certified. In a few cases certification was denied. This happened un-
fortunately in the Woodham case; 32 and, as already indicated, in Green
v. American Tobacco Co.122 the dissenting judges regretted that a second
certification was omitted.
V. CHOICE OF LAW RULES
During the last decade significant changes have occurred in some
areas of choice of law rules. Critical reappraisal of traditional maxims,
initiated by writers on the cathedra or on the bench, resulted in welcome
adjustments to the needs of a constantly changing society, particularly in
the area of torts and contracts. In other areas, locally strong rumblings
predict a spread of the reformation.
In Florida, however, prevailing judicial attitudes accompanied by
legislative inertia still prefer the traditional over the new. The only
significant changes are due to the conflict provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code123 adopted in 1965.
A. Torts
The disintegration of the time-honored lex loci delicti, initiated in
Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co. 24 and spreading in earnest since
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.325 and Babcock v. Jackson,26 con-
tinued at a more cautious pace once courts became aware of the side-
effects of these cases. The overall situation is well presented in a recent
case:
A majority of the states still adhere to the lex loci delicti rule.
Several of those states have considered recently the question of
whether to adopt the new principles advanced but have con-
cluded to continue the lex loci delicti rule. Some have done so on
318. 405 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1969).
319. Gaston v. Pittman, 224 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1969).
320. Trail Bldrs. Supply Co. v. Reagan, 409 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1969); cert. of S. Ct.
of Fla., Trail Bldrs. Supply Co. v. Reagan, 410 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1969).
321. Woodham v. Northwestern Steel & Wire Co., 390 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1968).
322. 409 F.2d 1166, 1170 (5th Cir. 1969) ; cert. of S. Ct. of Fla., 410 F.2d 763 (5th Cir.
1969).
323. See Survey II, at 498. Nordstrom, Choice of Law and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 24 Onio S.L.J. 364 (1963).
324. 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
325. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
326. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); see Woodward v.
Stewart, - R.I. -, 243 A.2d 917 (1968) (on constitutional issues involved); cf. Pooton v.
Berutich, 199 So.2d 139 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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the basis of the rule of stare decisis. Others have stated that
they were unwilling to change because they felt too many un-
certainties existed at the time with reference to possible applica-
tion of the proposed flexible rule. However, an increasing
number of jurisdictions have abandoned the inflexible applica-
tion of the rule of lex loci delicti in favor of a more flexible
choice of law in tort cases. The majority of these cases have
involved the application of host-guest statutes or the question
of inter-spousal liability for injuries received in automobile
accidents. 27
The new, flexible methods of implementing general principles expressed
in modern choice-of-laws rules are being rationalized by courts in differ-
ent ways:
[M]any courts have abandoned mechanical rules and have
instead selected the appropriate law by relying on forum policy,
analyzing governmental interests, or determining which state
has "the most significant relationship" with the litigated matter.
Whatever the difficulties attendant upon such flexible approaches
to choice of law, courts are at least free to make a reasoned
choice among potentially applicable rules of decision. 28
These needs for a reevaluation of the traditional rule have arisen mainly
from two factors: the varied kinds of relationships and dangers arising
out of modern transportation; 329 and the lag in state statutory and deci-
sional law, which in most instances has remained embarassingly anti-
quated and parochial. From such a variety of substantive and conflicts
tort rules a situation developed where the two factual forces in tort
litigation clashed, namely the plaintiff striving for the law most favor-
able to him, and the defendant (and his insurer) for that which favors
him. This leads to an unparalleled jockeying by the parties, both in
regard to the selection of the forum and in their preference for the con-
trolling choice-of-laws rules. Courts practically never touch upon this
real aspect of the issue but prefer to retreat into more distant, rather
abstract considerations involving the elusive idea of governmental inter-
est or the difficult to obtain ideal of "most reasonable relationship." One
thing seems certain-only a uniform nation-wide statute regulating li-
abilities arising from interstate and international transportation of peo-
ple by the various means promises a fair solution.
Florida has-after some vacillation-remained true to the lex loci
delicti, at least in Kilberg situationsY.33  Recently reported cases offered
327. Kennedy v. Dixon, 349 S.W.2d 173, 182 (Mo. 1969).
328. Brendle v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 408 F.2d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1968). It
appears that some twenty jurisdictions have abandoned the strict lex loci delicti rule.
Juenger, Choice of Law in Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 202 (1969).
329. See Survey III, at 543.
330. Kilberg v. Northeast Airline, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133
(1961); see Survey III, at 545. For a case where the Florida guest statute [FLA. STAT.
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no opportunity or temptation to join the ride on the new wave. An
accident on board a Caribbean cruise ship was involved in McGauley v.
Eastern Steamshiplines, Inc.;3"' however, the litigation did not progress
beyond the question of liability of the steamship lines for the cruiseship.
Equally unproductive in the conflict sense was the federal case of
Time, Inc. v. McLaney,'3 2 a libel action brought for Time's reporting on
the influx of domestic gangsters into the Bahama Islands. Guided by the
rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan313 and its progeny, the court
found that the plaintiff, although he did not have any official position,
had injected himself into the Bahamian election campaign and "thus lent
a direct influence to the election of a national government for the
country." 34 Therefore, he was held to be a "proper subject of inquiry
and public interest.'33 5
The application of Florida or New York law regarding misrepre-
sentation was at issue in a recent diversity case litigated in New York.336
The court adopted the conflict rule of the forum state, expressed in Auten
v. Auten,387 and found the center of gravity to be located in New York for
the following reasons:
The alleged misrepresentations were made and received both in
Florida and New York. Insofar as the laws of each are regula-
tory rules aimed at preventing misrepresentation, both states
would have equal interest in the matter. However, insofar as
these laws are aimed at compensating persons who suffered
injury because of reliance on misrepresentations, only New
York is concerned with the resolution of this issue. Plaintiff is a
New York corporation with its sole place of business in New
York. Its assets are situated in or at least channeled through
New York. The burden of any financial loss to plaintiff would,
therefore, fall most heavily on New York. Florida has no com-
parable interest. The fact that defendant corporation is a
Florida corporation is irrelevant to consideration of the conse-
quences of its alleged misconduct. Thus, New York has "the
greatest concern with the specific issue . . ." under considera-
tion here. 8 '
§ 320.59 (1967)] was applied to a claim arising from a car accident in Germany due to a
stipulation, see Kuklis v. Hancock, 304 F. Supp. 336 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
331. 211 So.2d 72 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
332. Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1969).
333. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
334. 406 F.2d at 573.
335. Id. Cf. Holmes v. Curtiss Publishing Co., 303 F. Supp. 522 (D.S.C. 1969).
336. Federated Capital Corp. v. Florida Capital Corp., 280 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
337. 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
338. Federated Capital Corp. v. Florida Capital Corp., 280 F. Supp. 301, 302 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
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B. Contracts
In transactions covered by the Uniform Commercial Code the lex
voluntatis determines the applicable law, provided that the transaction
"bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or
nation." 3 9 In such instances parties may adopt as the controlling legal
system the "law of this state or such other state or nation"34 except in
situations listed in paragraph 2 (discussed later). If there is no choice of
law by parties, "this code applies to transactions bearing an appropriate
relation to this state."34' There are no reported Florida cases dealing with
these provisions.
In a pre-Uniform Commercial Code case,342 the lex voluntatis was
included in promissory notes with a cognovit clause attached. The court
simply brushed aside the complex conflict issues involved on the
ground that "there is neither any Florida nor Illinois authority directly
in point, and we need not reach the conflict of laws in question."34 In
another pre-Uniform Commercial Code case, 44 the dissenting judge
pointed out, apparently not contradicting the majority opinion in this
respect,
The parties have stipulated that Florida law only is applicable
in this case. The facts occurred in 1965, prior to the effective
date of the Uniform Commercial Code, January 1, 1967. There-
fore, the Uniform Trust Receipts Law (Ch. 673) and Motor
Vehicle titling laws control. 45
A third case giving effect to the parties' choice of the controlling law, in
this instance the law of California, was Seaboard Finance Co. v. Mutual
Bankers Corp.146 The action arose between two Delaware corporations
and concerned the breach of warranty in a contract for the sale of ma-
jority stock holdings in a Florida corporation. The court noticed that
article XVII(3) of the contract provided that California law shall govern
the construction and enforcement of its provisions and applied California
decisional law.
In the area of insurance contracts, sporadic cases involving Cuban
claimants are still being litigated. In one case,34 the main issue turned
339. FLA. STAT. § 671.1-105(1) (1967). Weintraub, Choice of Laws in Contracts, 54
IOWA L. REv. 399 (1968).
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Vineberg v. Brunswick Corp., 391 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1968).
343. Id. at 186.
344. Barnett First Nat'l Bank v. Custom Fin. Co., 210 So.2d 291 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1968).
See note 22 supra.
345. Id. at 295.
346. 223 So.2d 778 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
347. Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir.
1968).
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on the act of state doctrine. In Confederation Life Association v. Vega y
Arminan, 41 various aspects of international conflict law were involved.
The claim was for the cash surrender value of an insurance contract
entered into in Cuba between a Cuban resident and the defendant
Canadian insurance company. The corporate defendant urged the applica-
tion of the strict lex loci contractus, which would bring into operation
present Cuban law. The court mentioned that there are four "most
generally recognized" tests: grouping of contracts or center of gravity;
the intent of parties; the place of contract; and the place of perform-
ance.14' Finding no authority which would specifically reject the other
tests, the court stated that "the lex loci contractus is preferable." 350
Thus the court laid the ground rule and turned to the particular nature
of the claim itself. In this respect, it distinguished between the insurance
contract and the "continuing, irrevocable offer of the company, which
offer matures into a contractual obligation only upon its being accepted
by the insured,"35' namely the offer of the cash surrender value of the
policy. Since the "acceptance by the insured of the company's offer was
also the last act necessary to complete the contract, and it was performed
in Florida, ''1 52 Cuba cannot be "the situs of this contract." 3  The attempt
by the defendant to bring into play the Bretton Woods Agreement was
unsuccessful in view of the fact that Cuba had withdrawn from the In-
ternational Monetary Fund."5 4 In concluding its opinion, the court turned
also to the equitable nature of the action and observed that the result is
equitable in view of the fact that the plaintiff "would have an absolute
right to a meaningful recovery were it not for the revolution in Cuba,"
adding:
Applying the maxim that equity looks at the substance rather
than the form of the transaction and since the primary purpose
of this transaction is the payment of the cash surrender value
of the policy after a period of twenty (20) years, and the pro-
vision being made in Havana is merely for the convenience of
the parties, there is no equitable reason why the plaintiff should
not recover.3 55
An issue involving interplay between Florida and Idaho law arose in
Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, Inc."' decided by the Idaho Supreme Court
on the point of reasonable attorney's fees for the plaintiff. The plaintiff
348. 207 So.2d 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
349. Id.; relying on Brown v. Case, 80 Fla. 703, 86 So. 684 (1920) which quotes from
Parry v. Lewis, 6 Fla. 555, 685 (1856).
350. Confederation Life Ass'n v. Vega y Arminan, 207 So.2d 33, 36 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
351. Id. at 37.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. See Bayitch, Florida and International Legal Developments: 1962-1963, 18 U.
MlAMi. L. REV. 321, 348 (1963).
355. Confederation Life Ass'n v. Vega y Arminan, 207 So.2d 33, 38 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
356. 449 P.2d 378 (Idaho 1968); cf. Castellano v. Bader Bros. Van Lines, Inc., 225
So.2d 439 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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moved from Florida to Idaho, shipping his household goods via the de-
fendant carrier. The goods were damaged in transit by the carrier. The
plaintiff's claim for damages was based on an insurance contract made
with the carrier in Florida. The court sought the law controlling the
attorney's fees by exploring the choice-of-law rules applicable to insur-
ance contracts. Even though the contract was delivered in Florida, the
court interpreted Idaho statutory provisions under the assumption that
the Idaho legislature "could not have intended to exclude . . . the cases
in which policies have been delivered outside of Idaho to persons who
thereafter take up residence in Idaho and subsequently find it necessary
to sue their insurers in Idaho courts. 35 7 Then, probing the question of
whether Idaho's statute allowing attorney's fees applied, the court decided
that it had a choice between Florida and Idaho laws, both allowing such
fees. Applying Florida law to grant attorney's fees was doubtful, however,
since section 627.0127 of the Florida Statutes applies only to proceedings
in Florida courts. The court dismissed using a procedural or substantive
characterization to solve the problem. It relied instead on Babcock,"'
Kilberg,3 9 Clark,3 60 Casey,36 1 and Reich,362 as well as the Restatement
Second,3 3 and surveyed choice-influencing factors involved. The only
fact in favor of applying Florida law was that the contract was negotiated
and concluded in Florida, since even the plaintiff's Florida residence was
abandoned due to his transfer. Contacts with Idaho were significant and
many. Idaho appeared as the place of performance of the insurance
contract since plaintiff would have to conduct his efforts to settle his
claims there; the plaintiff also paid the costs of shipments there, includ-
ing the additional insurance; goods had been shipped to Idaho; damage
was discovered there; and plaintiff was a resident of Idaho at the time of
the suit. The place where the damage to the goods occurred was held
immaterial, as was the fact that the shipment crossed a number of state
lines. In view of all this the court concluded that the law of Idaho applied
and granted the attorney's fees. It supported this ruling by noting that
federal law in the area of interstate carriers had not preempted the point
in issue.
Two labor cases had foreign contacts: one involving Jamaican agri-
cultural workers;1 64 the other an injunction against the picketing of a
foreign vessel. 65 In both cases Florida law was applied.
357. Id. at 381.
358. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
359. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1961).
360. Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
361. Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co., 247 Ore. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967).
362. Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
363. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (Proposed Official Draft,
1968).
364. Atkinson v. Florida Sugar Corp., 28 Fla. Supp. 135 (Dade County Cir. Ct. 1967).
365. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Ariadne Ship Co., 215 So.2d 51 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1968).
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Conflict rules governing sales contracts are now found among the
general provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.3 6 Two qualifying
exceptions, however, must not be overlooked. One affects the rights of
creditors against goods sold and provides:
A creditor of the seller may treat a sale or an identification of
goods to a contract for sale as void if as against him a retention
of possession by the seller is fraudulent under any rule of law of
the state where the goods are situated, except that retention of
possession in good faith and current course of trade by a mer-
chant-seller for a commercially reasonable time after the sale or
identification is not fraudulent. 67
Pursuant to Florida Statutes, section 671.1-105 (2) this provision may not
be changed by the lex voluntatis unless such agreement is effective under
the law of the situs of the goods, including its conflict rules, thus admit-
ting renvoi.
The other exception affects bulk transfers. Except for instances listed
in section 676.6-103 of the Florida Statutes, "all bulk transfers of goods
located within this state are subject to this chapter,"'868 i.e., the Uniform
Commercial Code. Consequently, it would seem that the lex situs im-
posed by this section may not be eliminated by parties' choice of law.
However, in this instance the provision simply makes no sense, because
it refers to a unilateral conflict rule limiting the scope of the substantive
rules regulating bulk transfers, i.e., goods situated within Florida. Of
course, if one would prefer to interpret this provision in a facetious
spirit, the startling conclusion might be reached that by applying the
law of the situs (Florida), "including the conflict of laws rules," a com-
plete circle would be closed and the originally qualified first paragraph
of Florida Statutes section 671.1-106, including the lex voluntatis, would
reappear on the scene.
In an action'6" against the debtor and the surety, the question arose
as to what law shall determine the application of payments received by
the creditors. The court relied on Florida law on the strength of payments
having been made there.
It may be added that the Uniform Commercial Code contains a
conflict rule regarding a bank's liability, separate from the general con-
flict rules contained in section 671.1-106 of the Florida Statutes. The
rule applies to actions or non actions in regard to items "handled by it
[the bank] for purposes of presentment, payment or collection."37 The
366. FLA. STAT. § 671.1-105 (1967). "Appropriate relation" and "significant contract"
have the same meaning, Gen. Electric Credit Corp. v. Heintz Constr. Co., 302 F. Supp. 958
(D. Ore. 1969).
367. FLA. STAT. § 672.2-402(2) (1967).
368. FLA. STAT. § 676.6-102(4) (1967).
369. Turner Prod. Co. v. Lake Shore Growers Coop. Ass'n, 217 S.2d 856 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1969).
370. FLA. STAT. § 674.4-102(2) (1967).
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liability of the bank is determined by the law of the place where it is
located. If the liability-creating act occurred in a branch or separate
office, "its liability is governed by the law of the place where the branch
or separate office is located." In both cases the proviso of paragraph (2)
of section 671.1-106 applied, namely that the law chosen by the parties
will prevail only if its provisions are "permitted" by the law of the situs,
including its conflict law, thus raising difficulties already indicated.
C. Negotiable Instruments
In Banco de Honduras, S.A. v. Prenner3 71 two checks had been
stopped to the disadvantage of the plaintiff. The court held that all
signers of the checks, including those who did not sign in a representative
capacity, even though they were members of what is termed in Honduran
law an "irregular society," were liable for payment. However, the con-
trolling Honduran law was, in the opinion of the court, lengthy and "with-
out conceivable value as a Florida precedent, ' 7 2 and therefore was not
recited.
D. Property
1. REAL PROPERTY
The new Florida Constitution of 1968 guarantees, among other
basic rights, the right "to acquire, possess and protect property."37
This guarantee is now qualified by the exception that the "ownership,
inheritance, disposition and possession of real property by aliens ineligible
for citizenship may be regulated or prohibited by law," '374 thus granting
the legislature the authority to enact discriminatory legislation against
aliens. However, the provision replacing a previously nondiscriminatory
clause075 may become open to a successful attack on Federal Consti-
tutional grounds. In any case, the criterion of eligibility for United
States citizenship has become, due to statutory changes in the immigra-
tion and naturalization acts,3 76 a rather unwieldy device. Of course,
treaties may supersede both the new constitutional authority and the
legislation emanating from it. Among treaties in force, 77 the Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees 78 may be mentioned. It accords to
aliens within the scope of the Protocol a treatment
371. 211 So.2d 600 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
372. Id.
373. FLA. CONST. Art. I, § 2 (1968).
374. Id.
375. Bayitch, Aliens in Florida, 12 U. MIAMI L. REV. 129, 145 (1958).
376. Hughes v. Kerfoot, 175 Kan. 181, 263 P.2d 226 (1953).
377. Bayitch, Conflict Law in United States Treaties, 9 Mix.v L.Q. 9 (1955).
378. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, [1968] 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No.
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as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable
than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances,
as regards the acquisition of movable and immovable property
and other rights pertaining thereto, and to leases and other
contracts relating to movable and immovable property.3 9
This provision guarantees refugees treatment equal to that enjoyed by
aliens generally and does not conflict with the constitutional change in
Florida since the latter does not impose on aliens in the status of refugees
a treatment less favorable than that granted to aliens generally.38°
After a procedural skirmish reported in the previous Survey, 8 ' the
matter of protection to be granted to substantive interests in the area of
the continental shelf, located off the eastern coast of Florida was litigated
in United States v. Ray."8 2 The action was instituted by the government
against a latter-day conquistador who planned to take possession of reefs
off Florida, settle them with people and defend the new nation against
all newcommers. This was to be done in alliance with four investors. On
their part, the investors had more rewarding plans in mind: to utilize
millions of dollars worth of newly created real estate, coupled with
gambling, radio and television rights, stamps, banking in the Swiss mode
and a government palace with a congress building. The government ob-
tained a temporary injunction in 1965. In order to make the injunction
permanent, the government relied on two counts: one in trespass and the
other urging lack of a necessary permit on the part of the defendants. The
government failed on the first count, the court holding that defendants'
work on the continental shelf did not amount to quare clausum fregit in
view of the fact that the plaintiff was "not in actual possession of these
reefs, and since it apparently has not claimed their title." '383 But it
succeeded on the second count, lack of a permit required under the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 189984 which granted authority to the Secretary of
the Army and was extended by the Outer Continental Shelf Land Act.385
In regard to defendants' claim of ownership by occupation, the court
held that such claim was inconsistent not only with the latter Act but also
with the Convention on the Continental Shelf.8 ' The court concluded
that "whatever proprietary interests exist with respect to these reefs,
379. Id. art. 13.
380. Survey III, at 553-54.
381. FLA. CoNsT. Art. I, § 2 (1968).
382. 294 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Fla. 1969); aff'd in part and rev'd in part under United
States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1970). The appellate court held that the United States
has a personal property interest in the resources of the outer continental shelf sufficient to
support an action against trespass thereto.
383. Id. at 541.
384. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1964).
385. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(f) (1964).
386. April 29, 1968, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578 (effective June 10, 1964).
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belong to the United States;" and although these interests may be lim-
ited, they are nevertheless the only interests recognized by the law.3 87
2. PERSONAL PROPERTY
Litigation involving chattels predominately involves motor vehicles
moving in interstate commerce and subject to changing titles and liens.
Except for two exceptions,388 there are no federal statutes covering con-
flict problems arising in personal property law. Thus the issues are de-
termined by state conflict law and the resulting state substantive law.
However, as a result of the practically nationwide adoption of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, its conflict provisions became the primary source
with regard to security transactions. 89
With respect to conflict rules, security transactions under the Uni-
form Commercial Code fall into two main classes. The first class includes
transactions defined in section 679.9-102, paragraph (1) (a) and (b), and
paragraphs (2) and (3). They are controlled by the Code provided that
they concern "any property and fixture within the jurisdiction of this
state," i.e. by the lex situs as long as it is within Florida. The other class
are termed multiple transactions according to section 679.9-103 of the
Florida Statutes and, depending on additional factors, are governed by
the law of the state where the commercial records are kept, by the law at
the chief place of business, by the law of the situs, or by the law of the
jurisdiction which issued the certificate.9 ' However, Florida's law regard-
ing motor vehicle title certificates in chapter 319 of the Florida Statutes
was not repealed. On the contrary, it takes "precedence over any pro-
vision of this code which may be inconsistent or in conflict therewith." '91
How much these conflict rules may be affected by party choice of
law is difficult to determine. As was mentioned before, the general conflict
rule of the Uniform Commercial Code, giving effect to the lex voluntatis,
is qualified by provisos contained in paragraph (2) of the same section,
one of which refers to the "policy and scope of the chapter on secured
transactions." This provision shall prevail so that "a contrary agree-
ment is effective only to the extent permitted by the law (including
387. United States v. Ray, 294 F. Supp. 532, 542 (S.D. Fla. 1969). For action on a
check as downpayment for a Georgia farm, see Popwell v. Abel, 226 So.2d 418 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1969) ; lease governed by the lex situs, Americana Hotel, Inc. v. Zable, 226 So.2d
272 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
388. 49 U.S.C. § 313(d) (1964) (motor vehicles); 49 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964) (aircraft),
see Survey II, at 532.
389. There are exceptions in Florida which will be discussed infra. See generally
Weintraub, Choice of Law in Secured Personal Property Transactions: the Impact of
Art. 9 of the U.C.C., 68 Micn. L. REv. 683 (1970); Bayitch, Aircraft Mortgage in the
Western Hemisphere: Recent Developments, 2 LAWYER OF THE AMERICAs 137, 152 (1970).
390. FLA. STAT. § 679.9-103(1)-(3); cf. Skinner v. Tober Foreign Motors, Inc., 345
Mass. 429, 187 N.E.2d 669 (1963).
391. FLA. STAT. § 680.10-104(2) (1967).
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conflict of laws rules) so specified." Difficulties in reaching a reasonable
interpretation of these provisions are discussed in this section (choice-
of-law rules) topic B (contracts) supra.
The law in force prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code in Florida may be illustrated by four reported cases. In Steingold
v. L & L Motors, Inc., 92 the outcome depended on the effect to be given
a Michigan decree dealing with the lien on the car. Even though the court
found this decree not binding because of lack of privity, it nevertheless
held that
the proceedings [in Michigan] by the lienor against the party
holding possession for the plaintiff resulted in a declaratory
ruling that there was outstanding a lien for the amount in excess
of the price paid for the car by the plaintiff, and in the enforce-
ment of the lien by an award of possession of the car to the lien
claimant. 9
Consequently, the plaintiff was entitled to judgment for the damages
caused by breach of warranty of the title to the car. In Gelfo v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp.,94 the prospective buyer of a car failed to
check with the proper authority in New York as to whether there were
any outstanding liens. Therefore, he was held to be in the position of
"an ordinary purchaser of chattels covered by an outstanding retain-title
contract, to wit, subject to all outstanding conditional sale contracts or
prior liens." '95 In Brinkly v. Freedom National Bank, 96 a summary
judgment in favor of the assignee of a conditional sales contract, recorded
in New York, replevying the encumbered car was reversed for failure to
show the nonexistence of material facts. The situation arose prior to the
1965 enactment of the statutory provision covering interests in motor
vehicles. 97 The case was solved on the authority of City of Cars, Inc. v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp.,"8' holding that a lien would not be en-
forced if the innocent purchaser made a proper and reasonable inquiry
into the state of prior registration, and the inquiry failed to disclose the
existence of a prior lien.
Finally, the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees3 119 provides
in article 30:
(1) A Contracting State shall, in conformity with its laws and
regulations, permit refugees to transfer assets which they have
brought into its country, to another country where they have
been admitted for the purposes of resettlement.
392. 207 So.2d 19 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
393. Id. at 20.
394. 206 So.2d 247 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
395. Id. at 249.
396. 210 So.2d 465 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
397. FLA. STAT. § 319.27(3) (1967) ; see Survey II, at 534.
398. 175 So.2d 63 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) ; Survey II, at 532.
399. See note 26 supra.
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It is to be noted that this provision contains a full reservation in favor
of local law.400 The following paragraph recommends that contracting
states "give sympathetic consideration to the application of refugees" in
regard to the transfer of assets "wherever they may be" and whatever is
necessary for resettlement in a country where they have been admitted.
E. Family Law
1. MARRIAGE
Even though common-law marriages cannot be established in Florida
any more,"' such marriages will still be recognized provided the "present
mutual consent" took place in Florida prior to the effective date of the
1967 amendment. Thus in 1969, a Delaware federal court in Cook v.
Carolina Freight Carriers Corp.4"2 recognized a Florida common-law
marriage by finding that in 1962 Florida recognized common-law mar-
riages as valid between parties who moved to Florida from a state which
denied such recognition.#3
In regard to refugees within the scope of the Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees,40 4 their status shall be "governed by the law of
the country of their domicile or, if he has no domicile, by the law of the
country of his residence." Previously acquired status, particularly mar-
riage, "shall be respected by the Contracting State, subject to com-
pliance, if this be necessary, with the formalities required by the law of
that State, provided that the right in question is one which would have
been recognized by the law of that State had he not become a refugee. 4 °5
2. SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
The rule that separate maintenance is available only where there is
a marital relation between parties in existence was decisive in Brandt v.
Brandt.406 The action by the wife was unsuccessful since she was unable
to prove that the Missouri divorce decree obtained by her husband on
constructive service was faulty and constituted a fraud on the divorce
court.
3. DIVORCE JURISDICTION
Florida's requirement of "residence" of at least six months" 7 was at
issue in Rosborough v. Rosborough, °8 where dismissal of the action
400. Bayitch, Conflict Law in United States Treaties, 9 MIAmi L.Q. 9 (1955).
401. See Survey III, at 553.
402. 299 F. Supp. 192 (D. Del. 1969).
403. Navarro, Inc. v. Baker, 54 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1951).
404. [1968] 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577.
405. Id. art. 12.
406. 217 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
407. FLA. STAT. § 61.021 (1967).
408. 208 So.2d 470 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
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against the nonresident wife was affirmed on the basis that the alleged
residence was not proven by a preponderance of evidence. Similarly, a
New York court found a Florida divorce decree to be invalid due to lack
of a bona fide domicile on the part of the plaintiff.4"9 In Rosenstiel v.
Rosenstiel,41° the fact that a Florida divorce decree was obtained by the
defendant husband five hours prior to an order issued by a federal court
in New York restraining the husband from prosecuting his Florida divorce
action saved him from possible contempt of court. The action, brought in
New York by the wife, demanded a declaratory judgment regarding her
rights under an ante-nuptial agreement and other remedies. The federal
court accepted jurisdiction over the declaratory part but denied other
relief against the defendant, now a Florida resident. In addition to the
time element, the federal court believed that the plaintiff's motion to
enjoin the defendant was, in fact, an effort to enjoin the Florida divorce
court from proceeding in the same action, which would constitute a
measure barred under section 2283 of the Judiciary Act."'
4. FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREES
Opposing the wife's claim for arrears based on an Indiana divorce
decree, the defendant husband in Harrington v. Harrington12 urged that
the decree incorporating a property settlement should not be given full
faith and credit in Florida on the ground that the Indiana divorce court
still had the power to cancel the arrears or to modify the decree retro-
spectively. The Florida court found, however, that the Indiana court only
retained jurisdiction to "enforce the obligations of the parties under the
separation agreement, which obligations the parties are directed to
perform," ' which does not amount, expressly or impliedly, to the power
to cancel or modify. The divisible nature of divorce decrees was decisive
in Orlowitz v. Orlowitz 414 The Florida court, faced with a Pennsylvania
"ex parte" decree, restated the rule that "a divorce proceeding has two
separate aspects, i.e., that relating to the marriage and that relating to
the personal property rights and obligations of the parties," adding that
"while domicile of the plaintiff alone is sufficient for determination of the
former, personal jurisdiction is required for the latter." '415 Consequently,
the court held that a collateral attack on the validity of the foreign decree
regarding property rights prevents the establishments of this part of the
decree as a local decree.
A defense of res judicata and estoppel, based on a New Jersey
409. Krieger v. Krieger, 29 App. Div. 2d 43, 285 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1967).
410. 278 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
411. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964).
412. 213 So.2d 744 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
413. Id. at 746.
414. 208 So.2d 849 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
415. Id. at 951.
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separate maintenance decree, was advanced in Aufseher v. Aujseher,418
a divorce action brought by the husband on the grounds of extreme cruelty
and desertion. The wife's defense was held to be untimely since it was
raised only on appeal.
5. ALIMONY
The power of a Florida court regarding an extrajudicial separation
agreement including alimony, entered into in Ohio, was the subject of
litigation in Cordrey v. Cordrey.4 17 Even though the wife subsequently
obtained a Pennsylvania divorce decree which made no mention of the
previous agreement, the Florida court, relying on section 63.15 of the
Florida Statutes, held that it had the "power and duty to review and
adjudicate the reasonableness and fairness"41 of the separation agree-
ment, provided that there are two grounds to do so: either the "circum-
stances of the parties have been changed since the execution of such
agreement or the financial ability of the husband shall have changed since
the execution of such agreement." 19 Since there was overwhelming ev-
idence of a change in circumstances of the parties, the court reviewed the
agreement and declared it unfair.
Claims based on a Florida separate maintenance decree were pressed
against the husband in the federal court in Alabama in Maner v.
Maner.420 While the court was willing to enforce the Florida decree as to
accrued arrears, it denied full faith and credit to future installments on the
ground that they were not final and, under Florida law, may be modified
as circumstances require. Even though the Alabama courts may, as a
matter of comity, enforce future installments, the federal court "sitting
in effect as an Alabama court in a diversity case ' 42' felt bound by what
it called Alabama law. In a subsequent action affirmed on appeal the
plaintiff again succeeded despite the defendant's insistence that the judg-
ment was still on appeal, that separate maintenance awards are inherently
not final and therefore unenforceable under the full faith and credit
clause, and that the defendant was not personally served with process in
the proceedings instituted by the plaintiff in Florida to reduce the arrears
to judgment. 22 In respect to the first defense, the court held that accord-
ing to Florida law maintenance arrears are enforceable although appeal
416. 217 So.2d 868 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
417. 206 So.2d 234 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
418. Id. at 239.
419. Id. For an example of garnishment of salary against a "head of a family residing
in this state" under FLA. STAT. §§ 61.12 and 222.11 (1967) to enforce a private agreement
entered into in Georgia and reduced to judgment in Florida, see Healey v. Toolan, 227
So.2d 55 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969) ; La Grone, Recovery of a Florida Judgment by Garnishing
Wages of the Head of a Family, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 196 (1964).
420. 401 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1968). The prior litigation is found in Maner v. Maner,
279 Ala. 652, 189 So.2d 336 (1966), and Maner v. Maner, 302 F. Supp. 894 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
421. 401 F.2d at 618.
422. Maner v. Maner, 412 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1969).
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was pending unless the defendant posts a supersedeas bond, which was not
the case here. Since the arrears involved had been reduced to judgment in
Florida and as such entitled to full faith and credit, the court found it
unnecessary
to determine the question it begged: whether, under Florida
law, accrued installment payments are subject to such retro-
active modification as would vitiate a foreign suit on the judg-
ment. Although we note that Florida courts generally hold that
separate maintenance payments are vested rights not subject
to modification [e.g., English v. English, 117 So.2d 559 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1960); Goff v. Goff, 151 So.2d 294 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1963)], we also find it unnecessary to determine this elusive
question of Florida law since [plaintiff] has reduced the accrued
payments to a judgment for a sum certain.423
Finding no substantial support in statute or case law for the second
proposition that a Florida court can modify such a judgment, it held that
the judgment was final and entitled to full faith and credit. Finally,
regarding personal service in this action, the court found that the defen-
dant was apprised of the proceedings and was therein represented by a
retained counsel, and added:
Under Florida law, enforcement of alimony decrees can be had
on "reasonable notice which affords an opportunity to be heard."
Kosch v. Kosch, 113 So.2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1959). We hold that
the arrearage judgments ... do not offend Florida's doctrine of
fair notice. Id. accord: Prensky v. Prensky, 146 So.2d 604,
605 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962); Arrington v. Brown, 116 So.2d 461,
462 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).424
6. CUSTODY
The jurisdictional issue was raised in Rich v. Rich, 25 an action by
the resident mother against the nonresident father involving custody of
their nonresident children. The appellate court considered such matter
to be "in the nature of an in rem action," and held that the court "within
whose territorial jurisdiction the children reside has jurisdiction to ad-
judicate an issue of custody even though a parent resides in another
state."4 6 The court admitted that in a custody case constructive service
of process on one of the nonresident parents "should be sufficient to accord
him the process of law."427 However, in Rich, it was not the mode of
service on the nonresident father but rather the absence of the children
423. Id. at 451.
424. Id. at 452.
425. 214 So.2d 777 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
426. Id. at 779.
427. Id.
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from the territorial jurisdiction of the court that made the disposition of
the lower court reversible.
A similar jurisdictional issue was presented in Nieburger v. Nie-
burger. 8 Suing for divorce, the minor's mother asked for the return
of the child who was living with his aunt in New Mexico. Her motion
was denied on the authority of Smith v. Davis,429 which held that "courts
have no jurisdiction to initially adjudicate the custody of a minor child
unless such child is physically present within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court at the time the suit seeking adjudication is filed." ' This rule
prevails even when "personal service of process is had upon the defendant
who had the custody of the child in a foreign jurisdiction."43'
A custodial arrangement, included in a Tennessee divorce decree,
may be modified in Florida only if the petitioner is able to prove that
there has been "a material change in conditions since the decree, or that
there were material facts bearing on the question of custody that were
unknown to the Tennessee court at the time it entered the decree,"
provided that such change is in the "best interest of the children." '482
7. MARITAL PROPERTY
The wife's interest in a Maryland farm was at issue in Fuller v.
Fuller.488 When the spouses ended their separation and agreed to a marital
reconciliation, the husband deeded to the wife his interest in the farm,
until then held by the spouses as tenants by the entirety. After the parties
moved to Florida, apparently some time prior to March 1966, they
executed a note to a local bank with the understanding that this would
be paid from the proceeds of the Maryland farm. The subsequent litiga-
tion involved the remainder of the proceeds from the farm after payment
of the debt. The lower court ordered it divided equally between the
parties. The appellate court reversed, declaring the wife to be the sole
owner. The method that the court used in solving the conflict issues in-
volved is difficult to understand. It found that the farm was located in
Maryland and that the agreement of reconciliation was reached when both
parties still resided there. Nevertheless, the only reference to Maryland
as the lex situs is the statement that the "validity and enforceability of
a reconciliation contract has been upheld in Maryland." '434 From this
point on, Florida law was applied. The court found that the transaction
was a contract rather than a gift and held that the presumption in favor
428. 214 So.2d 382 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
429. 147 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
430. Nieburger v. Nieburger, 214 So.2d 382, 383 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
431. id.
432. Brownlow v. Earthman, 220 So.2d 28, 29 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
433. 215 So.2d 507 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
434. Id. at 509.
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of a gift was not overcome.4 The court did not explain why Florida law
prevailed.
F. Decedent's Estates
Among the conflict problems pertaining to assets left by the deceased
and claims under the will and the laws of descent and distribution, prob-
lems of probate and administration are not only the most frequent but
also the most diffuse. In two recent Florida cases some of the fundamental
rules have been restated.
The probate of a will is a "judicial proceeding to establish the legal
status of the purported will and to furnish the means of establishing by
record evidence the validity of rights existing thereunder," and as such
it is considered a "proceeding in rem.1 486 In regard to conflict problems,
the following rules prevail:
Probate of a will must be made primarily at the domicil of
the decedent, the will being governed by that law. Probate there
is binding on all questions as to the legality of the will with re-
gard to personal estate elsewhere, but not on the existence of
domicil there, if it is disputed in another court by anyone not a
party to the prior proceedings, for the question of domicil being
jurisdictional so far as establishing the validity of the will
outside the state of domicil is concerned, that cannot be estab-
lished if the domicil is disputed. 7
Further conflict considerations are stated in Biederman v. Cheatham:
43 8
As between different states or nations, jurisdiction to admit to
probate the will of a decedent depends upon his domicile at the
time of his death or upon the location of his property at that
time, or both.489
In .Curtiss v. McCall,440 the decedent died in Santa Rosa County,
Florida and was buried there. An administrator was appointed by a
Georgia court. At the request of the Georgia administrator, ancillary
letters of administration were issued to the petitioner in Florida. There-
after, the Florida court issued domicilary letter of administration to
respondent. The ancillary administrator applied for a writ of prohibition
to prevent the Florida court from proceeding to probate the estate. The
ancillary administrator relied on the following grounds: 1) the Florida
court lacked jurisdiction since the Georgia court was "vested with
435. Id. at 510.
436. Biederman v. Cheatham, 161 So.2d 538, 541 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), cert. denied, 168
So.2d 146 (Fla. 1965).
437. Lowenthal v. Mandell, 125 Fla. 685, 698, 170 So. 169, 173 (1936); cf. Nelson v.
Miller, 201 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1952); Nelson v. Miller, 160 Fla. 410, 35 So.2d 288 (1948).
438. 161 So.2d 538 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
439. Id. at 541.
440. 224 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
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priority of jurisdiction;" 2) the Florida court was, in effect, "entertaining
an unlawful collateral attack;" and 3) the Florida court was "embarass-
ing and hindering the ancillary administration" granted by the Georgia
court.441 The appellate court denied the writ of prohibition in view of the
following facts: the deceased died a resident of Santa Rosa County; the
administrator with Florida domiciliary letters represented decedent's
brother, the only known heir; the decedent had property in the county;
the decedent's funeral bill "was before the court;" the decedent's debts
and expenses incurred in the same county exceeded the value of assets
located there; and the decedent was buried in a Florida county. 442
The court based its holding on the rule granting jurisdiction to the domicile
at the time of death and the place wherein property was located. It
ruled that the Georgia court's issuance of letters of administration to the
ancillary administrator did not conclusively establish that the court had
adjudicated its jurisdiction but was only prima facie evidence of an
adjudication. The full faith and credit clause did not preclude a court
in another state from investigating the question of domicile.
The place of domicile at the time of death is a jurisdictional
question of fact which is not conclusively established by the
appointment of an administrator, and in a proper collateral
action the true place of residence of the deceased may be shown
to disprove jurisdiction in the court assuming to administer the
estate. Probate courts, not being courts of general jurisdiction
in the course of common law, are not subject to the rule of pre-
sumptions as to jurisdiction, but jurisdiction must appear on
their records.443
An additional ground for the court's decision was the rule that the full
faith and credit clause does not "preclude a court in another state from
investigating and determining the question of the decedent's domicile"
unless a party is estopped by res judicata "by having previously unsuc-
cessfully contested the issue in the court of another state. 444 The record
did "not reflect any contest of the issue of residence or domicile ever
raised in either state, ' 445 i.e., Florida or Georgia.
The perennial question of whether an administrator has standing
to sue in a jurisdiction other than that in which he was appointed, was
involved in Blum v. Salyer.446 The action was brought by a Florida
441. Id. at 356.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. 299 F. Supp. 1074 (W.D. Mo. 1969). Alabama administratrix may sue in Florida.
Florida C. & P.R. Co. v. Sullivan, 120 F. 799 (5th Cir. 1903).
The holding in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) will affect the Florida Iron
Curtain rule enacted in 1959; see Survey I, at 319. For possible impact of the Zschernig
ruling on jurisdictional long-arm statutes, see Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth,
417 F.2d 231, 239 (9th Cir. 1969).
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appointed administratrix against the decedent's former wife for account-
ing and reconveyance of title to property in Missouri. Since the action
was brought in a federal court in Missouri, based on diversity, any
limitation imposed on this kind of action in state courts would be
binding on federal courts as well. The federal court dismissed the
action on the ground that according to Missouri law a personal repre-
sentative of a deceased can maintain an action in his official capacity
outside of the state where he is appointed only by express permission
granted by statute.447 It was lacking in this case.
G. Corporations
Even though the Uniform Commercial Code is not concerned with
business associations as institutions, it contains a choice of laws rule
worth mentioning here. It deals with investment securities and provides
that:
The validity of a security and the rights and duties of the
issuer with respect to registration of transfer are governed by
the law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdic-
tion of organization of the issuer."'
This rule is subject to two qualifications. One originates from the
Uniform Commercial Code, namely, from its general conflict rule con-
tained in section 671.1-105(1) of the Florida Statutes. The Code section
provides that with regard to the "applicability of the chapter on invest-
ment securities (678.8-106)" these provisions apply and a "contrary
agreement is effective only to the extent permitted by the law (including
the conflict of laws rules) so specified." '449 Difficulties arising from this
provision have already been indicated. The second qualification to the
rule in section 678.8-102(1) is due to the fact that this conflict rule
remains subject to the conflict rule in the Uniform Act for Simplification
of Fiduciary Security Transfers,"' adopted in Florida in 1961. The
uniform act was not repealed, but "shall take precedence over any
provisions of this code which may be inconsistent or in conflict there-
with.,,451
The legal nature of an unincorporated entity under the laws of
Honduras was litigated in Banco de Honduras S.A. v. Prenner.5 2 It may
be gleaned from the cryptic opinion that an action was brought against
three individuals, two corporations and an unincorporated entity, because
payment of two checks had been stopped to the disadvantage of the
plaintiff. The main difficulty apparently centered around a partnership
447. Id. at 1076.
448. FLA. STAT. § 678.8-102(1) (1967).
449. FLA. STAT. § 671.1-105(2) (1967).
450. FLA. STAT. § 610.091 (1967).
451. FLA. STAT. § 680.10-104(2) (1967).
452. 211 So.2d 600 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
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formed by the two corporate defendants which was doing business under
the name of "Southern General." The court found Southern General to
be an irregular company under Honduran law453 and not a partnership
as initially indicated, an irregular company being a "corporation not
meeting the requisites of a corporation under Honduran law." This con-
clusion was reached on the fact that Southern General did not register
in Honduras nor did it "add an abbreviation to its name, such as S.A.,
S.A.R., or L.R.,454 to indicate its corporate status,' 455 as if the mere
addition of any of these abbreviations would make it an association
designated by such abbreviation. The court found the rule that "Hon-
duran law would hold liable the drawers of the checks and all those
persons who appear to be forming or acting members of such com-
pany," '456 is uncontradicted and judgment was entered "against all of
the defendants who were acting as members of this irregular company
as the defendant. 4 57
H. Taxation
The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 458 provides in
art. 29 that:
The Contracting States shall not impose upon refugees duties,
charges or taxes, of any description whatsoever, other or higher
than those which are or may be levied on their nationals in
similar situations.
This provision grants refugees equal national treatment subject to a
reservation on the part of the United States that this provision will be
construed as "applying only to refugees who are resident in the United
States, so that nonresident refugees may be taxed in accordance with
its general rules relating to nonresident aliens. 459
Florida's power to tax was successfully challenged when the sales
tax incident was food and drinks sold to fishermen in the Gulf of
Mexico beyond the three leagues limit.4' ° The plaintiff, the owner of a
fleet of boats who, for a fee, took fishermen on fishing trips in the Gulf,
was able to prove that the equipment and tackle were used and the food
453. Codigo de Comercio, art. 17 (1950) provides that irregular societies even though
not inscribed in the commercial register, but holding themselves out as such, have juridicial
personality, meaning that they may be subjects and objects of duties and obligations.
Moreover, according to paragraph (3) of the same article, persons who act as their repre-
sentatives or agents are responsible to third persons in solidum.
454. Under the Honduran Commercial Code, however, there are no societies whose
abbreviations would be S.A.R. or L.R.
455. Banco de Honduras, S.A. v. Prenner, 211 So.2d 600, 601 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
456. Id.
457. Id. Cf. Yarnall Warehouse & Transfer, Inc. v. Three Ivory Brothers Moving Co.,
226 So.2d 887 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
458. [1968] 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577. See note 26 supra.
459. Id., No. 6577, at 35.
460. Straughn v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., 210 So.2d 266 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
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and drinks were sold beyond the state's territorial waters. The Florida
appellate court held the rule that no state may "tax persons, property,
or interests which are not within the territorial jurisdiction" '' also
applied to sales taxes, and the injunction against such taxing was
upheld. The federal court, however, dismissed an action to enjoin the
seizure under customs laws of a yacht brought from the Bahamas to
Miami for want of jurisdiction in federal courts.6 2
I. Criminal Law
The principle expressed in the lex loci criminis makes the applica-
tion of substantive criminal law comparatively simple. The issue of the
locus criminis was raised in State v. Potter,465 involving shrimping in a
prohibited area of Monroe County. In his defense, the defendant alleged
that the act took place beyond the boundaries of both the county and
Florida and requested a ruling on this point. Pursuant to this request,
the trial court certified the question, concerning Florida's territorial
waters around the Dry Tortugas and the boundaries between the Dry
Tortugas and the mainland, to the Florida Supreme. Court. Since the
trial court had ruled on the question, however, the supreme court
held that the question was reviewable only on appeal. Another conser-
vation case464 dealt with the Florida statute which not only establishes
a closed season for crawfish but also limits transportation of crawfish
during this period, regardless of where taken, except-under certain
conditions-imports from foreign countries. 465 The statute survived an
attack on constitutional grounds because the court found that domestic
and foreign crawfish are practically indistinguishable, making a general
precautionary rule imperative in the interests of the domestic crawfish
industry.
In State v. Darnell,4 66 involving the failure to support a wife and
children, the criminal desertion statute was interpreted so as to demand
that both the delinquent father and the victims be present within
Florida.4 1 7 Since the defendant was in Arkansas and the statute was
criminal in nature and therefore calling for restrictive interpretation,
the mere fact that the victimized children resided in Dade County did
not suffice.468
461. Id. at 267.
462. Argosy Ltd. v. Henningan, 404 F.2d 14 (5th Cir. 1968).
463. 224 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1969).
464. Kenny v. Kirk, 212 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1968).
465. FLA. STAT. § 370.14(4), (5) (1967).
466. 217 So.2d 127 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
467. FLA. STAT. § 856.04 (1967).
468. See also Fearing v. United States, 403 F.2d 60 (10th Cir. 1968) (transportation of
stolen motor car from Florida to Wyoming) ; Stewart v. United States, 395 F.2d 484 (8th
Cir. 1968) (transportation of stolen aircraft from Florida to Iowa) ; Bush v. United States,
389 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1968) (seizure of aircraft exported from United States for bombing
Cuba); United States v. Black, 291 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (operation of vessel on
high seas for gambling).
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VI. AVIATION LAW
Recently the United States ratified the Convention on Offences and
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft signed in Tokyo in
1963.469 The Convention is rather limited in scope; nevertheless, some
of its provisions deserve a brief summary. The Convention deals with
two main topics: criminal jurisdiction of member countries4 70 and the
authority of aircraft commanders in criminal and related situations.471
The latter is implemented by provisions dealing with powers and duties
of contracting countries in relation to the exercise of this authority,
particularly in cases of delivery or disembarking of passengers. 472 Fur-
thermore, there are a number of collateral matters included, among them
air piracy4 78 and certain aspects of extradition.4 74 Limiting this summary
to conflict rules, it must be emphasized that the Convention did not
create a uniform law of the air nor establish generally applicable conflict
rules regarding criminal acts on board aircraft. Instead, the Convention
has authorized member countries to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
acts committed on board aircraft registered in their country, provided
that they occur "while the aircraft is in flight or on the surface of the
high seas or of any other area outside the territory of any State.) 475
In exercising criminal jurisdiction within these limits, a member country
may not interfere with aircraft in flight (within the area just identified),
except when the aircraft involved is of the same nationality or in the
following cases:
(a) the offence has effect on the territory of such State;
(b) the offence has been committed by or against a national or
permanent resident of such State;
(c) the offence is against the security of such State;
(d) the offence consists of a breach of any rules or regulations
relating to the flight or manoeuvre of aircraft in force in
such State;
(e) the exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to ensure the obser-
vance of any obligation of such State under a multilateral
international agreement.476
469. Sept. 14, 1963, [19701 - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 6768. As of January 1, 1970, the
Convention was adopted by the following countries: Canada; Republic of China; Denmark;
Ecuador; Germany; Israel; Italy; Madagascar; Mexico; Netherlands; Niger; Norway;
Philippines; Portugal; Saudi Arabia; Spain; Sweden; United Kingdom; United States, and
Upper Volta. See generally Boyle & Pulsifer, The Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 30 J. Am. L. & Com. 305 (1964); Denaro, In-
Flight Crimes, the Tokyo Convention, and Federal Judicial Jurisdiction, 35 J. Am. L. &
Com. 171 (1969); Mendelsohn, In-Flight Crime: The International and Domestic Picture
under the Tokyo Convention, 53 VA. L. REV. 509 (1967).
470. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
Sept. 14, 1963, ch. II., [1969] - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 6768.
471. Id., ch. III.
472. Id., ch. V.
473. Id., ch. IV.
474. Id., ch. VI.
475. Id., art. 1(2).
476. Id., art. 4.
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It is indeed interesting that hot pursuit of a foreign aircraft for criminal
acts committed on board within the airspace of a member country is not
a ground for the otherwise authorized interference. It is also a pity that
the method of permissible interference is not described.
The second matter covered by the Convention is the authority
granted to aircraft commanders in matters of safety and in regard to
criminal acts on board. For this part of the Convention, however, a
different area of application has been adopted. The authority granted
may be exercised only in regard to
offences and acts committed or about to be committed by a
person on board an aircraft in flight in the airspace of the State
of registration or over the high seas or any other area outside
the territory of any State unless the last point of take-off or
the next point of intended landing is situated in a State other
than that of registration, or the aircraft subsequently flies in
the airspace of a State other than that registration with such
person still on board.477
A Chilean bank sued two air carriers, two Florida banks, and an
armoured service corporation for the loss of currency transported by
air from Miami to Santiago.478 Only a procedural question was before
the appellate court; whether the pleadings were sufficient to state a
cause of action. The court held that the inability of the plaintiff to
pinpoint the exact link in the chain of events at which the negligence
occurred did not render the pleadings insufficient.4 7 The United States
was sued for releasing a "repossessed" aircraft to the Venezuelan author-
ities in Four Star Aviation, Inc. v. United States.480 The aircraft, mort-
gaged in Florida, was later sold to a Venezuelan air carrier which assumed
the mortgage and agreed to pay the remaining installments. When the
Venezuelan air carrier defaulted, the plaintiff creditor simply sent two
pilots to Venezuela where they "repossessed" the aircraft and brought it
to Puerto Rico. The Venezuelan authorities demanded it from the Chief
of Aviation in Puerto Rico as stolen property. The Chief first consulted
the Federal Aviation Agency as to what to do. The Agency correctly
answered that it had no jurisdiction in the matter. The Chief then
turned to the Secretary of State of Puerto Rico who, in turn, contacted
the Head of the Office of Carribbean Affairs at the United States
Department of State. This officer, in turn, consulted the Director of
Columbian and Venezuelan Affairs in the same Department.48 The court
found that the Head of the Office of Caribbean Affairs gave the following
Delphic answer, over the phone to the Puerto Rican Chief of Aviation:
477. Id., art. 5(1).
478. Banco Cont'l v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 406 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1969).
479. Id., at 514.
480. 409 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1969).
481. Why was the Office of the Legal Advisor bypassed?
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"As far as the Department of State was concerned, there was no objec-
tion to it (the airplane) being returned to the Venezuelan govern-
ment. ' 482 Acting on this advice, Puerto Rican authorities released the
plane to Venezuelan officials. In spite of plaintiff's urging that the
advice on the part of the United States constituted a "negligent or
wrongful act or omission" in the terms of the Federal Tort Claims Act,
he did not succeed, mainly because of fatal discrepancies in the testimony
of the officials involved.
For having operated a helicopter some eight miles off Port Ever-
glades, Florida, in a "manner and in such close proximity to a Coast
Guard helicopter engaged in a search and rescue operation, as to
endanger lives and property of the Coast Guard crew and that of the
operator himself and his passenger," the operator was given a 30-day
suspension of his pilot certificate under section 91.1(b) of the Federal
Aviation Regulations and under sections of Annex 2 to the Convention
on International Civil Aviation. 88 The latter point was questioned by
the operator on the ground that the Annex has no force as a treaty but
is foreign law and has to be proven as fact, which was not done. The
National Transportation Safety Board held the Annex to be
an agreement which is drawn up pursuant to the terms of the
Convention and in no way can be considered to be foreign law.
It represents an international agreement to which the United
States is a party; and to the extent the United States partici-
pates in the agreement, it is, at the least, a document resulting
from the executive action of the U.S. Government, as well as
that of other signatory governments. Consequently, this docu-
ment cannot be analogized to foreign law . . .However, the
question still remains whether Annex 2 can be considered part
of the Chicago Convention and hence possesses all the legal
incidents of a treaty. It clearly is authorized by that Conven-
tion.4a
Nevertheless, the Board continued to explore the legal authority of
Annex 2 in the following way:
While it is true that the standards contained in the Annex are
authorized to be established by the provisions of the treaty,
it by no means follows that the Congress has ratified the pro-
visions of the Annex, so that it may be considered part of the
treaty. However, it is self-evident that the Annex, and the stan-
dards established therein, are authorized by the treaty and
become effective unless rejected by executive action of the
U.S. Government. Since the U.S. Government has not rejected
482. Four Star Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 409 F.2d 292, 294 (5th Cir. 1969). Why
was this important answer never confirmed by telegram?
483. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No.
1591, U.N.T.S. 295 (effective April 14, 1947).
484. National Trans. Safety Bd., (No. SE-1027, December 18, 1968).
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these provisions, they, therefore, have become effective by
executive action.485
A bill has been introduced in Congress to provide federal substantive
law and exclusive federal jurisdiction for all claims arising out of the
air accidents.486
VII. ADMIRALTY
From the conflict viewpoint, admiralty law presents both jurisdic-
tional and choice of laws issues. Jurisdictional problems in most cases
revolve around state-federal relations in adjudicating admiralty matters.
Three bodies of law, however, state, federal, and maritime, may clash
in choice of laws situations. The line of demarcation between the appli-
cation of substantive admiralty law or state law is not always as simple
as it seems. It is well-recognized that in contract matters admiralty law
depends upon the nature of the transaction, while in tort matters the
locality of the tort, whether on land or on the sea, is decisive.487 There
are twilight zones, however, which include not only internal waters,
waterways, rivers, and lakes, but also territorial waters and the epi-
continental sea, i.e., the sea over the continental shelf and the structures
erected thereupon.
Regarding fatal torts which occur on navigable waters within
Florida, the Florida Supreme Court held that recovery may be had
for wrongful death under the state statute. 88 Consequently, the common
law defense of contributory negligence is available, not the admiralty
defense of comparative negligence.
485. On technical annexes under art. 12 of the Convention on International Civil
Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, U.N.T.S. 295 (effective April 4,
1947), see Ljostad, The Technical Annexes of the Chicago Convention, 1 Aaxiv Poa
LUFTRETT 43 (1958); Carroz, International Legislation on Air Navigation over the High
Seas, 26 J. Am. L. & CoM. 158 (1959); ICAO: International Standards in the Technical
Annexes-Their Effect within the United States and Validity under the Constitution, 21
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 86 (1952); T. BUERGENTHAL, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL
CIvIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION 80 (1969).
486. Presently S. 961, introduced by Senator Tydings, is being discussed before a
subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary [Aircraft Crash Litigation: Hearings on S.
961 Before the Subcomm. on Improvement of the Judiciary, United States Senate, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969)]. This bill originated from S. 3305 and S. 3306 submitted during the
past session [Aircraft Crash Litigation: Hearings on S. 3305 and S. 3306 Before the Subcomm.
on Improvement in Judicial Administration of the Committee of the Judiciary, United
States Senate 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968)]. The present bill provides, inter alia, for excusive
jurisdiction of federal courts in aviation accident actions, except for concurrent jurisdiction
over claims arising from ground activities and over claims not within exclusive federal
jurisdiction. The bill also introduces federal substantive law for claims arising from air acci-
dents, including general liability, contributory negligence, contribution, survival of actions
and wrongful death claims.
487. Rodrique v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, (1969); Grant Smith-Porter Ship
Co. v. Rhode, 257 U.S. 469 (1922).
488. Bilbrey v. Weed, 215 So.2d 479 (Fla. 1968).
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In Empire Seafoods, Inc. v. Anderson,48 9 a shrimper struck a bridge,
under construction, which spanned the Florida Intercoastal Waterway
and injured two operators. Relying on admiralty law which could
exonerate or limit liability of the boat owner, the court denied exoner-
ation or limitation of the owner's liability because of his failure to
provide for a lookout and because of the boat captain's negligence in
navigation.
Another accident on Florida's navigable waters (the St. John's
River in Duval County), was the subject of state court litigation in
Roundtree v. A.P. Moller Steamship Co.4 90 In that case, the defendant
operated its seagoing vessel with such speed and power as to cause a
strong wake which, in turn, capsized the plaintiff's boat and resulted in
injuries to him. The court found jurisdiction under section 1333 of the
Judiciary Act4.. which, in the court's interpretation, grants state courts
concurrent jurisdiction. Turning to the substantive aspect of the case,
the court admitted that "maritime law, not state law, is the substantive
law that is applied in cases of maritime tort occurring on the navigable
waters of this country, whether an action thereon is brought in a state
or federal court.149 2 Yet, the court relied on Florida's Motorboat Safety
Law enacted in 1959."' 3 In a similar case,494 the defendant and his wife
petitioned for exoneration or limitation of liability for damages, invoking
the federal statute.4 95 The court found that the damage did not occur
without the defendant's privity or knowledge49 6 since he operated the
boat and his wife knew it, and thus ruled adverse to the petition.
Maritime liens appeared in a number of cases litigated in Florida.
In Camper v. Nicholsons, Ltd. v. Yacht "Fontainebleau II,"0 7 a British
corporation tried to enforce a maritime lien for goods and services
furnished to the vessel in an action in rem. A Bahamian corporation
claimed ownership and filed a counterclaim against the corporate plain-
tiff, alleging damages due to misrepresentation by the corporate plaintiff
in the sale of the yacht. The court, in dismissing the counterclaim, held
that a contract for the sale of a vessel is not maritime in nature and is
therefore unenforceable in admiralty, and that a claim for breach of
warranty in such sale does not constitute a cause of action cognizable
489. 398 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1968).
490. 218 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
491. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964). On jurisdiction recently: Smith v. Guerrant, 290 F. Supp.
111 (S.D. Tex. 1968); American Mfg. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Manor Inv. Co., 286 F. Supp. 1007
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
492. Rountree v. A.P. Moller Steamship Co., 218 So.2d 771, 774 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
493. FLA. STAT. § 371.52 (1967).
494. Fecht v. Makowski, 406 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1969).
495. 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1964); cf. Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Gay Cottons, 414
F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1969); Ross, Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Revisited, 10 S. TEx L.J.
1 (1969).
496. Fecht v. Makowski, 4006 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1969).
497. 292 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
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in admiralty. In Stern, Hays & Lang, Inc. v. M/V Nil 4 9 a number of
participants enlivened the scene. The vessel Nili, sponsored by the State
of Israel, built by the British, financed by the Scots, owned by an
Israeli corporation, chartered by a New York corporation, and operating
from the port of Miami, "apparently developed certain financial prob-
lems including an alleged failure to make payments against an alleged
maritime mortgage."4 9 In an opinion written in a sparkling style, the
court found itself in the role of "an effective resource for settling at
least this mild international financial crisis between the vessel's sov-
ereign, her corporate subject, a ship of her flag, and such flotsam
creditors of all nations as might follow in M/V Nili's wake,"' 00 Regard-
less of the fact that the ship was "thoroughly seized by Israel's libel of
foreclosure and generally under a series of plasters of intervening and
hopeful creditors, the orders of consolidation confected a glorious Donny-
brook Fair, with each turning on the other as he felt the exigencies of
the moment warranted. ' 50 1 Out of all this, one claim emerged for
adjudication: the claim of a corporate agency for a maritime lien as a
result of advertising work for the vessel. Against a well-documented
position taken by the vessel, the court held that printing on behalf of
a vessel is already recognized as a lien-creating activity and that labor
in this connection may also create a lien. The difference between the
two activities is only one of degree." 2
A case with real international flavor developed in In re Unterweser
Reederei, GMBH. °8 These proceedings started with an action filed by
the Zapata Off-Shore Company against the Unterweser Reederei for
damages sustained by plaintiff's rig Chaparral while in tow of defen-
dant's Bremen. Subsequently, the defendant used a prorogation clause
in the towage contract to institute an action against the plaintiff in
the High Court of Justice in London for monies due under the towage
contract and for breach of contract. Defendant also filed a petition for
exoneration or limitation in the federal courts, followed by an action
identical with the one filed in London. After further procedural moves,
the question clearly emerged: On the plaintiff's motion, may the federal
court in the case pending before it enjoin the defendant from prose-
cuting its action against the plaintiff in a foreign country, i.e., England.
Since the petition for limitation or exoneration is equitable in nature,
the court reasoned, it may, once it has acquired jurisdiction over the
parties, proceed and determine all matters relating to the controversy
498. 407 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1969).
499. Id. at 550.
500. Id.
501. Id.
502. Id. at 551.
503. 296 F. Supp. 733 (M.D. Fla. 1969). Two other maritime cases litigated in federal
court were: Joseph L. Wilmote & Co. v. Cobelfret Lines, 289 F. Supp. 601 (M.D. Fla. 1968)
(carriage of goods); Fort Myers Shell & Dredging Co. v. Barge NBC 512, 404 F.2d 137
(5th Cir. 1968) (salvage of a vessel).
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and enjoined the defendant. Admitting freely that a federal court seized
with the litigation "cannot act extraterritorially, ' 4 it does, nevertheless,
have the power to control the action of the parties properly before it.
Since the defendant was not only properly brought before the court but
also had affirmatively invoked its jurisdiction, it was subject to the
court's power.505
504. Id. at 736.
505. Recent decisions concerning liability to passengers: Silvestri v. Italia Societa per
Azioni di Navigazione, 388 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1968); Traub v. Holland-America Line, 278 F.
Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
